OmniRoute is an AI gateway that gives coding agents one endpoint for accessing models from many providers, with quota-aware fallback between them. It is for people using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Cline, Copilot, and similar tools who want a single route to their available AI models.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --skill cli-servegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRouteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/cli-serve)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/cli-serve"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/cli-serve/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/cli-serve"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/cli-serve.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 5 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 76 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 14 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Excessive Agency · line 128 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 160 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Agent Snooping · line 162 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 163 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 164 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 165 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 176 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 259 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 259 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.02393 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00957 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00479 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00239 |
Grade A, and why
cli-serve scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- cli-serve — 100% identical, 20 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 321 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Overview
Start, stop, and restart the OmniRoute server from the CLI. Manage daemon mode, port configuration, auto-recovery, system tray integration, and the dashboard open shortcut.
Quick install
npm install -g omniroute # or: npx omniroute
omniroute --version
Subcommands
dashboard
Flags:
--url--port <port>--tui
Example:
omniroute dashboard
restart
Flags:
--port <port>
Example:
omniroute restart
serve
Flags:
--port <port>--no-open--daemon--log--no-recovery--max-restarts <n>--headless--tray--no-tray--ready-timeout <ms>--tls-cert <path>--tls-key <path>
Example:
omniroute serve
stop
Flags:
--port <port>
Example:
omniroute stop
Setup
The omniroute binary ships with the OmniRoute server. It is both the server launcher and a full management CLI with 250+ commands across 39 groups.
Install
npm install -g omniroute # npm registry
# or: use the binary bundled with the desktop app
Requires Node.js ≥22.22.2 or ≥24.
Verify:
omniroute --version # prints installed version
omniroute --help # full command tree
Connection
Every CLI command that talks to the server reads two values:
| Source | Variable / Flag |
|---|---|
| Base URL | OMNIROUTE_BASE_URL or --base-url |
| API key | OMNIROUTE_API_KEY or --api-key |
Default base URL: http://localhost:20128
export OMNIROUTE_BASE_URL="http://localhost:20128"
export OMNIROUTE_API_KEY="sk-..." # from Dashboard → API Manager
For a remote server:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday Changed · +5 lines f738c55805ea
- 5d ago Changed ed15d344e6f6
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines 1abb2541d683
- 1mo ago First seen · 315 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 5ecee73fcc96
cli-serve is a skill published in the GitHub repository diegosouzapw/OmniRoute (77,028 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 2,393 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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Web and X search via 9Router /v1/search using Tavily / Exa / Brave / Serper / SearXNG / Google PSE / Linkup / SearchAPI / You.com / Perplexity / Xquik. Use when the user wants to search the web, find articles, or search public X posts.
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Generate images via 9Router /v1/images/generations using OpenAI / Gemini Imagen / DALL-E / FLUX / MiniMax / SDWebUI / ComfyUI / Codex models. Use when the user wants to create, generate, draw, or render an image, picture, or text-to-image (txt2img).
9router-tts
Text-to-speech via 9Router /v1/audio/speech using OpenAI / ElevenLabs / Deepgram / Edge TTS / Google TTS / Hyperbolic / Inworld voices. Use when the user wants to convert text to speech, generate audio, voiceover, narrate, or read text aloud.