OmniRoute is an AI gateway that gives coding agents one endpoint for accessing models from many providers, with quota-aware fallback between them. It is for people using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Cline, Copilot, and similar tools who want a single route to their available AI models.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --skill omni-combos-routinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRouteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-combos-routing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-combos-routing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-combos-routing.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 5 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Tool Misuse · line 72 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 125 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Prompt Injection · line 179 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Memory Poisoning · line 227 Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 22 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 179 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 183 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 243 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.02373 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.01187 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00475 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00237 |
Grade A, and why
omni-combos-routing scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl https://localhost:20128/api/combos \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 311 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Overview
Create and manage routing combos with 19 strategies (priority, weighted, round-robin, Auto-combo, and more). Configure fallback chains, test routing outcomes, and retrieve combo metrics.
Authentication
All requests require a valid Bearer token or session cookie. Obtain a token via POST /api/auth/login or configure REQUIRE_API_KEY=false for local development.
Endpoints
GET /api/combos
List routing combos
curl https://localhost:20128/api/combos \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN"
POST /api/combos
Create routing combo
curl -X POST https://localhost:20128/api/combos \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
GET /api/combos/{id}
Get combo by ID
curl https://localhost:20128/api/combos/{id} \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN"
PUT /api/combos/{id}
Update combo
Partial update: the body is merged onto the stored combo, so a field left out keeps its current value. An array that IS sent replaces the stored one outright.
curl -X PUT https://localhost:20128/api/combos/{id} \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
PATCH /api/combos/{id}
Update combo
Partial update: the body is merged onto the stored combo, so a field left out keeps its current value. An array that IS sent replaces the stored one outright.
curl -X PATCH https://localhost:20128/api/combos/{id} \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
DELETE /api/combos/{id}
Delete combo
curl -X DELETE https://localhost:20128/api/combos/{id} \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN"
GET /api/combos/metrics
Get combo metrics
curl https://localhost:20128/api/combos/metrics \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OMNIROUTE_TOKEN"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed · +40 lines b2ce1329550b
- 8d ago First seen · 271 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 43b6fa92b9c0
omni-combos-routing is a skill published in the GitHub repository diegosouzapw/OmniRoute (62,601 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 2,373 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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