omni-inference

omni-inference is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from diegosouzapw/OmniRoute. It costs 47 tokens per session (6,359 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

An OpenAI-compatible interface for common AI tasks, including chat, text embeddings, image generation, speech, moderation, reranking, and Responses API requests. It also includes managed connection leases for exclusive inference sessions.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to send chat and Responses requests, create embeddings or images, convert speech to text or text to speech, moderate content, rerank results, and manage exclusive inference connections.
Why use it?
It gives applications one integration surface for different AI operations and configured providers. Exclusive leases help coordinate access when a connection must be reserved for one authenticated owner.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Use it to send chat and Responses requests, create embeddings or images, convert speech to text or text to speech, moderate content, rerank results, and manage exclusive inference connections.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference
About the project

OmniRoute is an AI gateway that gives coding agents one endpoint for accessing models from many providers, with quota-aware fallback between them. It is for people using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Cline, Copilot, and similar tools who want a single route to their available AI models.

diegosouzapw/OmniRoute · 78,973 stars · on GitHub · omniroute.online

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --skill omni-inference
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for omni-inference

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for omni-inference

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 47 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 6,359 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • Socket pass 19 Oct 2026
  • Snyk warn 19 Oct 2026
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 29 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Prompt Injection · line 5
    Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 334
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 507
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 585
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 614
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 672
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 692
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 761
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 852
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 997
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 1079
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Prompt Injection · line 1362
    Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 31
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 399
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 410
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 423
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 1366
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 1430
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 1471
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 1512
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00047 $0.06359
Opus 5.5 $0.00019 $0.02544
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00009 $0.01272
Haiku 4.5 $0.00005 $0.00636

Measured 3d ago against content hash d67215ee8b0e, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

omni-inference scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl $OMNIROUTE_URL/v1/models | jq '.data[].id'
skills/omni-inference/SKILL.md · 465 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 465 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Overview

The core OpenAI-compatible inference endpoints: chat completions, embeddings, images, audio (TTS/STT), moderations, rerank, and the Responses API. The primary integration surface for AI agents.

Authentication

All requests require a valid Bearer token or session cookie. Obtain a token via POST /api/auth/login or configure REQUIRE_API_KEY=false for local development.

Endpoints

Read the full file on GitHub · 465 lines

Files

What ships with it

1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago Changed · +1 lines d67215ee8b0e
  2. 11d ago Changed b514ba16852b
  3. 22d ago Changed · -1,213 lines 9e1b943f0ac8
  4. 1mo ago Changed · +892 lines 7a589b5d2b19
  5. 1mo ago First seen · 785 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A f7d63aa2f5a7

Subscribe to this mod's changes

omni-inference is a skill published in the GitHub repository diegosouzapw/OmniRoute (78,973 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 6,359 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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