OmniRoute is an AI gateway that gives coding agents one endpoint for accessing models from many providers, with quota-aware fallback between them. It is for people using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Cline, Copilot, and similar tools who want a single route to their available AI models.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --skill omni-inferencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRouteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-inference.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk warn
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 29 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 5 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Tool Misuse · line 334 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 507 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 585 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 614 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 672 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 692 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 761 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 852 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 997 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1079 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1362 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 31 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 399 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 410 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 423 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 1366 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 1430 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 1471 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 1512 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.06359 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.02544 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.01272 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00636 |
Grade A, and why
omni-inference scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl $OMNIROUTE_URL/v1/models | jq '.data[].id' How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 465 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Overview
The core OpenAI-compatible inference endpoints: chat completions, embeddings, images, audio (TTS/STT), moderations, rerank, and the Responses API. The primary integration surface for AI agents.
Authentication
All requests require a valid Bearer token or session cookie. Obtain a token via POST /api/auth/login or configure REQUIRE_API_KEY=false for local development.
Endpoints
POST /api/v1/session-leasesGET /api/v1/searchPOST /api/v1/searchPOST /api/v1/chat/completionsGET /api/v1/wsPOST /api/v1/providers/{provider}/chat/completionsPOST /api/v1/api/chatPOST /api/v1/messagesPOST /api/v1/messages/count_tokensPOST /api/v1/responsesPOST /api/v1/embeddingsGET /api/v1/multimodal-embeddingsPOST /api/v1/multimodal-embeddingsPOST /api/v1/providers/{provider}/embeddingsPOST /api/v1/images/generationsPOST /api/v1/providers/{provider}/images/generationsPOST /api/v1/audio/speechPOST /api/v1/audio/transcriptionsPOST /api/v1/moderationsPOST /api/v1/rerankGET /api/v1GET /api/v1/providers/{provider}/modelsGET /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptionsPOST /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptionsGET /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptions/{id}PATCH /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptions/{id}DELETE /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptions/{id}GET /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptions/{id}/nodesPOST /api/v1/management/proxy-subscriptions/{id}/refreshPOST /api/v1/ocrPOST /api/v1/audio/translationsGET /api/v1/voicesPOST /api/v1/speech-to-textPOST /api/v1/text-to-speech/{voiceId}GET /api/v1/explain/routingGET /api/v1/providers/suggested-modelsGET /api/v1/provider-plugin-manifestGET /api/v1/{omnirouteCatchAll}POST /api/v1/{omnirouteCatchAll}PUT /api/v1/{omnirouteCatchAll}PATCH /api/v1/{omnirouteCatchAll}DELETE /api/v1/{omnirouteCatchAll}GET /api/v1/accounts/{id}/limitsPUT /api/v1/accounts/{id}/limitsGET /api/v1/agents/credentialsPOST /api/v1/agents/credentialsGET /api/v1/agents/healthGET /api/v1/agents/tasksPOST /api/v1/agents/tasksDELETE /api/v1/agents/tasksGET /api/v1/agents/tasks/{id}POST /api/v1/agents/tasks/{id}DELETE /api/v1/agents/tasks/{id}POST /api/v1/antigravityGET /api/v1/auto-combo/{channel}/candidatesGET /api/v1/batchesPOST /api/v1/batchesGET /api/v1/batches/{id}DELETE /api/v1/batches/{id}POST /api/v1/batches/{id}/cancelDELETE /api/v1/batches/delete-completedPOST /api/v1/classifyGET /api/v1/combosPOST /api/v1/completionsGET /api/v1/filesPOST /api/v1/filesGET /api/v1/files/{id}DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}GET /api/v1/files/{id}/contentPOST /api/v1/images/editsGET /api/v1/images/upscalePOST /api/v1/images/upscaleGET /api/v1/media/{id}POST /api/v1/issues/reportGET /api/v1/management/proxiesPOST /api/v1/management/proxiesPATCH /api/v1/management/proxiesDELETE /api/v1/management/proxiesGET /api/v1/management/proxies/assignmentsPUT /api/v1/management/proxies/assignmentsPUT /api/v1/management/proxies/bulk-assignGET /api/v1/management/proxies/healthGET /api/v1/me/statusGET /api/v1/muse-code/modelsGET /api/v1/music/generationsPOST /api/v1/music/generationsGET /api/v1/providers/{provider}/limitsPUT /api/v1/providers/{provider}/limitsGET /api/v1/quotas/checkGET /api/v1/registered-keysPOST /api/v1/registered-keysGET /api/v1/registered-keys/{id}DELETE /api/v1/registered-keys/{id}POST /api/v1/registered-keys/{id}/revokePOST /api/v1/relay/chat/completionsPOST /api/v1/relay/chat/completions/bifrostPOST /api/v1/responses/{path}GET /api/v1/search/analyticsPOST /api/v1/segmentGET /api/v1/video-bridge/drilldownDELETE /api/v1/video-bridge/drilldownGET /api/v1/videos/generationsPOST /api/v1/videos/generationsGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}POST /api/v1/vscode/{token}/api/chatPOST /api/v1/vscode/{token}/api/showGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}/api/tagsGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}/api/versionPOST /api/v1/vscode/{token}/chat/completionsGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}/combosGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}/modelsPOST /api/v1/vscode/{token}/responsesPOST /api/v1/vscode/{token}/v1/chat/completionsGET /api/v1/vscode/{token}/v1/modelsGET /api/v1/vscode/combos/{token}/{{slug}}POST /api/v1/vscode/combos/{token}/{{slug}}GET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}POST /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/api/chatPOST /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/api/showGET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/api/tagsGET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/api/versionPOST /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/chat/completionsGET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/combosGET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/modelsPOST /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/responsesPOST /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/v1/chat/completionsGET /api/v1/vscode/raw/{token}/v1/modelsPOST /api/v1/web/fetch
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +1 lines d67215ee8b0e
- 11d ago Changed b514ba16852b
- 22d ago Changed · -1,213 lines 9e1b943f0ac8
- 1mo ago Changed · +892 lines 7a589b5d2b19
- 1mo ago First seen · 785 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A f7d63aa2f5a7
omni-inference is a skill published in the GitHub repository diegosouzapw/OmniRoute (78,973 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 6,359 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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