OmniRoute is an AI gateway that gives coding agents one endpoint for accessing models from many providers, with quota-aware fallback between them. It is for people using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Cline, Copilot, and similar tools who want a single route to their available AI models.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --skill omni-settingsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRouteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-settings)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-settings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-settings/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-settings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/diegosouzapw/omniroute/omni-settings.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 17 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 5 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Tool Misuse · line 475 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 611 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 629 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 691 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 720 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 791 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 840 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 869 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 898 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 927 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 978 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1144 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1290 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1366 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 24 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 1383 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.03737 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.01495 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00747 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00374 |
Grade A, and why
omni-settings scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 19d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -X PUT https://localhost:20128/api/settings/thinking-budget \ Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- omni-settings — 94% identical, 514 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 185 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Overview
Read and update global application settings: system prompts, thinking budget, IP filters, payload rules, combo defaults, and require-login configuration.
Authentication
All requests require a valid Bearer token or session cookie. Obtain a token via POST /api/auth/login or configure REQUIRE_API_KEY=false for local development.
Endpoints
GET /api/settings/memoryPUT /api/settings/memoryGET /api/settings/qdrantPUT /api/settings/qdrantGET /api/settings/qdrant/healthPOST /api/settings/qdrant/searchPOST /api/settings/qdrant/cleanupGET /api/settings/qdrant/embedding-modelsGET /api/settingsPATCH /api/settingsPOST /api/settings/purge-request-historyGET /api/settings/compressionPUT /api/settings/compressionGET /api/settings/compression/mcp-accessibilityPUT /api/settings/compression/mcp-accessibilityGET /api/settings/payload-rulesPUT /api/settings/payload-rulesGET /api/settings/combo-defaultsGET /api/settings/proxyPATCH /api/settings/proxyPOST /api/settings/proxy/testPOST /api/settings/require-loginGET /api/settings/ip-filterPUT /api/settings/ip-filterGET /api/settings/piiPUT /api/settings/piiPOST /api/settings/pii/testGET /api/settings/system-promptPUT /api/settings/system-promptGET /api/settings/thinking-budgetPUT /api/settings/thinking-budgetGET /api/tagsGET /api/settings/quota-storePUT /api/settings/quota-storePOST /api/settings/purge-usage-historyGET /api/settings/authz-inventoryGET /api/settings/auto-disable-accountsPUT /api/settings/auto-disable-accountsGET /api/settings/background-degradationPOST /api/settings/background-degradationPUT /api/settings/background-degradationGET /api/settings/cache-configPUT /api/settings/cache-configGET /api/settings/cache-metricsDELETE /api/settings/cache-metricsGET /api/settings/cc-discovery-metricsGET /api/settings/compression/rulesGET /api/settings/compression/run-telemetryGET /api/settings/databasePUT /api/settings/databasePATCH /api/settings/databasePOST /api/settings/database/integrity-checkPOST /api/settings/database/refresh-statsGET /api/settings/database/vacuumPOST /api/settings/database/vacuumGET /api/settings/export-jsonGET /api/settings/faviconGET /api/settings/feature-flagsPUT /api/settings/feature-flagsDELETE /api/settings/feature-flagsGET /api/settings/free-proxiesDELETE /api/settings/free-proxiesPOST /api/settings/free-proxies/{id}/add-to-poolPOST /api/settings/free-proxies/bulk-add-to-poolGET /api/settings/free-proxies/statsPOST /api/settings/free-proxies/syncPOST /api/settings/import-jsonDELETE /api/settings/lkgp-cacheGET /api/settings/local-corpusPOST /api/settings/local-corpusDELETE /api/settings/local-corpusGET /api/settings/mitmPOST /api/settings/mitmPUT /api/settings/mitmGET /api/settings/model-aliasesPOST /api/settings/model-aliasesPUT /api/settings/model-aliasesDELETE /api/settings/model-aliasesGET /api/settings/models-devPOST /api/settings/models-devGET /api/settings/notionPOST /api/settings/notionDELETE /api/settings/notionGET /api/settings/obsidianPOST /api/settings/obsidianDELETE /api/settings/obsidianGET /api/settings/obsidian/webdavPOST /api/settings/obsidian/webdavDELETE /api/settings/obsidian/webdavGET /api/settings/oneproxyPOST /api/settings/oneproxyDELETE /api/settings/oneproxyPOST /api/settings/oneproxy/rotateGET /api/settings/proxiesPOST /api/settings/proxiesPATCH /api/settings/proxiesDELETE /api/settings/proxiesPOST /api/settings/proxies/{id}/repair-relayGET /api/settings/proxies/assignmentsPUT /api/settings/proxies/assignmentsPOST /api/settings/proxies/auto-testPOST /api/settings/proxies/batch-activatePOST /api/settings/proxies/batch-deletePUT /api/settings/proxies/bulk-assignPOST /api/settings/proxies/bulk-importGET /api/settings/proxies/egressPOST /api/settings/proxies/egressGET /api/settings/proxies/healthPOST /api/settings/proxies/migrateGET /api/settings/proxies/poolPUT /api/settings/proxies/poolPATCH /api/settings/proxies/poolDELETE /api/settings/proxies/poolGET /api/settings/proxies/pool/egress-observationPOST /api/settings/proxy/cloudflare-deployPOST /api/settings/proxy/deno-deployPOST /api/settings/proxy/vercel-deployPOST /api/settings/purge-call-logsPOST /api/settings/purge-detailed-logsPOST /api/settings/purge-logsPOST /api/settings/purge-quota-snapshotsGET /api/settings/quota/statePOST /api/settings/quota/stateGET /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rulesPOST /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rulesGET /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rules/{id}PATCH /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rules/{id}DELETE /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rules/{id}POST /api/settings/reasoning-routing-rules/simulateGET /api/settings/task-routingPOST /api/settings/task-routingPUT /api/settings/task-routingGET /api/settings/tier-configPUT /api/settings/tier-configGET /api/settings/transfer/catalogPOST /api/settings/transfer/exportPOST /api/settings/transfer/previewPOST /api/settings/transfer/import
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 19d ago Changed · +1 lines 19adbab9565f
- 20d ago Changed · +7 lines e1ba41dc95ee
- 1mo ago Changed · -1,225 lines 404ced7430d5
- 1mo ago Changed · +11 lines 023e371c8f62
- 2mo ago Changed · +975 lines 338ca2023928
- 2mo ago First seen · 416 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 769874473ebd
omni-settings is a skill published in the GitHub repository diegosouzapw/OmniRoute (83,309 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 3,737 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
omni-settings compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| omni-settingsdiegosouzapw/OmniRoute | Skill | 83k | 5d ago | MIT | A | 31 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-imagedecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 74 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-sttdecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 63 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-videodecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 74 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-web-fetchdecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 67 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-web-searchdecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 74 | Claude Code, Codex |
| 9router-chatdecolua/9router | Skill | 32k | 9d ago | MIT | A | 63 | Claude Code, Codex |