Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-anti-analysisgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-anti-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-anti-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-anti-analysis/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-anti-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-anti-analysis.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 82 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00126 | $0.05851 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00063 | $0.02926 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.01170 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00585 |
Grade A, and why
re-anti-analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 202 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
反分析对抗（壳识别 / 脱壳 / 反混淆）
完整工作流
- 壳识别：[[re-packer-id]] —— 先识别再动手。DIE/PEiD 签名库扫描、节名异常（UPX0/.aspack/自定义）、入口点是否指向非首节、熵 >7、导入表极小。先记 OEP 线索（EP 附近 pushad 等壳入口特征），识别出的壳名决定路径
- 分派：简单压缩壳（UPX/ASPack/FSG）→ [[re-unpack-simple]]；强壳/虚拟化壳（VMProtect/Themida）→ [[re-unpack-advanced]]；识别不出 → 手动流程（按 [[re-unpack-simple]] 的 ESP 定律 + 内存断点手动找 OEP，或按强壳流程处理），不硬猜壳名
- 简单壳脱壳：[[re-unpack-simple]] —— 优先官方/自动解包（
upx -d）→ ESP 定律 / 内存断点找 OEP → OEP 解密完成后转储（时机见 [[platform-tips]] 关键经验，默认转储优先）→ IAT 修复（Scylla/ImpREC，Windows） - 强壳脱壳：[[re-unpack-advanced]] —— 反调试对抗（scyllaHide 思路：NtQueryInformationProcess/时间差）→ 堆栈回溯/内存断点组合找 OEP → 转储（默认转储优先）→ IAT 修复（含重定向）→ 虚拟化代码区域标注（标记绕过而非还原）
- 反混淆：[[re-deobfuscate]] —— 脱壳后若仍有花指令 / 控制流平坦化 / 字符串加密：花指令清除、平坦化还原（D-810/手动）、字符串解密循环定位与仿真、批量脚本化、还原前后对比验证
- 验证：脱壳产物 sha256 存档 → 沙箱内复跑（[[re-sandbox]] 判定脱干净、[[platform-tips]] 最高原则）→ 导入 [[re-ghidra]] / [[re-ida]] 确认 OEP 处可正常反编译；导入表可解析才算完成。产物交回原调用域继续（恶意样本回 [[re-malware]] 行为分析、破解目标转 [[re-cracking]] 授权定位）
每步结果存档（证据路径 + sha256，见 [[re-triage]]）；壳指纹 / 脱壳产物是 [[re-ioc]] YARA 特征来源。
反调试方法论（全库通用，见 [[analysis-contract]] 索引）
本网关适用的反调试分析方法论（用户实战经验），各技能坑与陷阱引用此处。
基础检测
- AD1 启动即退出先查调试检测：EP/TLS/初始化函数
- AD2 IsDebuggerPresent 不代表完整反调试：组合检测，别只 patch 一点
- AD3 PEB BeingDebugged 用户态快速检测：找 PEB 访问/BeingDebugged/NtGlobalFlag
- AD4 NtGlobalFlag 异常→查堆调试标志
- AD5 CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 不可靠：可能被 hook/替换/底层
- AD6 NtQueryInformationProcess 是重点：ProcessDebugPort/ProcessDebugObjectHandle/ProcessDebugFlags
- AD24 断 WinAPI 没命中 → 可能直接走 Native API：程序不一定调用 IsDebuggerPresent 等高层 API，可能直接调用 NtQueryInformationProcess、NtSetInformationThread、Zw 系列。分析时向下追。
异常机制
- AD7 异常没崩溃→可能反调试：INT3/INT 2D/单步异常
- AD32 INT3 不止一种形式：CC vs CD 03 长断点，异常行为不同
- AD33 INT 2D 是 Windows 特殊反调试点：调试器下/正常运行行为不同
- AD34 ICE 指令检测单步：F1 ICEBP
- AD26 异常断点行为异常→查 VEH：AddVectoredExceptionHandler——INT3 被主动处理/单步异常被吞/异常后继续运行
- AD27 SEH 链异常→可能反调试控制流：控制跳转/隐藏流程/检测 debugger
时间检测
- AD8 断点后行为变化→查 Trap Flag：EFLAGS/异常次数
- AD9 时间突然变慢→查时间反调试：QPC/GetTickCount/timeGetTime/RDTSC
- AD10 RDTSC 检测不要只看一次读取：start-end delta、比较阈值、分支位置
- AD11 Sleep 检测→查时间加速：Sleep(5000)+检查实际经过时间——调试环境/沙箱加速/时间跳跃
- AD35 时间检测不只 RDTSC：RDTSCP/QPC/GetTickCount64/APIC timer
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 202 lines · 126 tokens per session scan A 5f2e266ce65f
re-anti-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 126 tokens to every session and 5,851 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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