Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-behaviorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-behavior)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-behavior"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-behavior.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 177 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 45 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 57 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 82 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 86 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 110 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 116 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00058 | $0.05039 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00029 | $0.02520 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.01008 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00504 |
Grade B, and why
re-behavior scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- 验证: `bpftrace --version`；`sudo bpftrace -e 'tracepoint:syscalls:sys_enter_execve { print(comm) }'` 能打印 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 178 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
恶意行为分析
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：判定样本"在干什么"——运行后的进程/文件/注册表/网络行为；识别持久化与注入；ATT&CK 战术映射
- 用：动态分析的证据收集环节（与 [[re-tracing]] 互补）
- 不用：样本还没在沙箱里跑过（先 [[re-sandbox]]——动态执行是强制前置，见 [[platform-tips]] 最高原则）
- 不用：只需静态结论（走 [[re-triage]] / [[re-binary-core]] 域）；只需内存内容（走 [[re-memdump]]）
工具准备
本技能分析的是沙箱运行产物——运行环境先由 [[re-sandbox]] 建立（默认沙箱最高原则，见 [[platform-tips]]）。
沙箱产物（运行环境前置）
- 由 [[re-sandbox]] 建立：VM 快照 / 容器 / firejail + 网络隔离（INetSim / fake DNS / 断网）
- 产物包括：行为日志、进程快照、INetSim 网络记录、内存转储（[[re-memdump]]）
- 验证: 沙箱内样本已按 [[re-sandbox]] 步骤跑完并产出日志
procmon / Process Monitor（Windows 行为记录主力）
- Windows: Microsoft Sysinternals ——
choco install sysinternals，或微软官网下载 Procmon64.exe - Linux/macOS: 不适用（用 sysdig / bpftrace；函数级记录见 [[re-tracing]]）
- 验证: 管理员运行 Procmon64.exe，出现捕获窗口并能记录事件
- 附加: Process Explorer（同套件）看进程树与句柄
sysdig（Linux 系统行为追踪）
- Linux:
apt install sysdig/dnf install sysdig/pacman -S sysdig - macOS/Windows: 不支持（Linux 专用）；WSL 内可用 Linux 版（需 root）
- 验证:
sysdig --version；sysdig -c topprocs_cpu能输出 - 常用:
sysdig proc.name=target -w out.scap录制，事后sysdig -r out.scap回放
bpftrace（Linux 内核级追踪，低开销）
- Linux:
apt install bpftrace/dnf install bpftrace/pacman -S bpftrace - 需要内核 BTF/追踪支持；macOS/Windows 不支持
- 验证:
bpftrace --version；sudo bpftrace -e 'tracepoint:syscalls:sys_enter_execve { print(comm) }'能打印 - 用途: 文件写、进程启动、网络连接等高频事件，比用户态监控轻量
MITRE ATT&CK 导航
- 无需安装: 浏览器开 https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/ 或 Navigator（https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/）
- 本地部署（可选）:
git clone https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator，静态页面直接打开 - 验证: 页面能按战术/技术检索
Windows/Linux 内置命令（持久化/网络检查，零安装）
- Windows:
reg query、sc query、schtasks /query /fo csv、netstat -ano、Get-CimInstance Win32_StartupCommand - Linux:
ps -ef --forest、ss -tnp、cat /etc/crontab、systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled - 验证: 各命令能正常输出
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步记下结果并保存证据（路径 + sha256）。
- 进程树与注入识别：
- Windows（沙箱内 procmon 录制中跑样本）: 过滤 Process Name = 样本，用 Process Explorer 的 Tree 视图看进程树——子进程、落盘后新起的进程（dropper → payload 两段）
- 注入特征序列（procmon / sysdig 过滤 API）:
- DLL 注入: OpenProcess → VirtualAllocEx → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread（目标进程被写 + 新线程）
- 进程空洞: CreateProcess(SUSPENDED) → NtUnmapViewOfSection → WriteProcessMemory → SetThreadContext → ResumeThread
- APC 注入: OpenThread → QueueUserAPC → ResumeThread
- Linux:
sysdig proc.name=target看 execve/clone 序列；ps -ef --forest看进程树 - 结论记录：注入目标、注入手法、被注入进程 PID
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 178 lines · 58 tokens per session scan B 889aa95af2a6
re-behavior is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (46 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 5,039 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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