Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-lldbgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-lldb)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-lldb"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-lldb/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-lldb"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-lldb.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 33 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.02302 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.01151 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00460 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00230 |
Grade B, and why
re-lldb scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- 旧系统: `sudo DevToolsSecurity -enable` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 130 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
lldb 动态调试（macOS/iOS）
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：macOS/iOS 目标动态调试（attach/启动/断点/表达式求值/符号查找）
- 用：Linux 上调试带 DWARF 的调试版程序（lldb 与 clang 工具链同源，DWARF 处理成熟）
- 不用：Linux 目标（[[re-gdb]]）、Windows 目标（[[re-x64dbg]]）
- 不用：iOS 越狱/证书环境问题（属 [[re-mobile]] 域）；只读内存（[[re-memdump]] 默认转储优先）
- 不用：脚本化大批量内存转储/取证（[[re-memdump]] / [[re-mem-forensics]] 更对口）
工具准备
参考 [[platform-tips]] macOS 分支——SIP 与 TCC 限制 attach，需 Developer Tools 授权。
lldb
- macOS: 自带（Xcode Command Line Tools:
xcode-select --install） - Linux:
apt install lldb/dnf install lldb/pacman -S lldb - macOS 更全:
brew install llvm（含新版 lldb） - 验证:
lldb --version - 版本差异: Xcode 自带 lldb、llvm.org 的 lldb、Swift 工具链 lldb 功能近似但版本号不同（
lldb --version确认）；脚本依赖lldb.SBDebuggerAPI 时跨版本兼容性需验证（见 [[gotchas]]）
SIP 关闭或授权（attach 前置）
- 系统设置 > 隐私与安全性 > 开发者工具 > 授权使用 lldb 的终端（TCC 授权）
- 旧系统:
sudo DevToolsSecurity -enable - 说明: 一般不要关 SIP（可只对调试需求临时处理）；iOS 内核级调试需 KDK/开发内核，属 [[re-mobile]] 域
操作步骤
-
Developer Tools 权限确认：
lldb -p <测试进程pid> # 若报 "please check the developer mode" / 权限拒绝 → 去系统设置授权终端授权后重启终端；仍失败再检查 SIP 状态:
csrutil status。 注意: TCC 授权弹窗需在系统设置手动确认，无法命令行绕过。 -
attach/启动：
(lldb) process attach --pid <pid> # 附加 (lldb) process attach --name Safari # 按名字附加（需唯一） (lldb) target create ./sample # 或直接启动 (lldb) run --args arg1 (lldb) continue / ciOS 设备:
platform select remote-ios+process connect connect://<device>（需配合调试服务，越狱/证书要求见 [[re-mobile]]）- attach 时机注意: 目标已运行过初始化逻辑，入口前行为看不到——需要从入口看就
target create+run启动模式 - 启动停在入口:
process launch --stop-at-entry（等价-s）
- attach 时机注意: 目标已运行过初始化逻辑，入口前行为看不到——需要从入口看就
-
image lookup符号：(lldb) image lookup -n main # 按名字查符号 (lldb) image lookup -a $pc # 按地址查当前所在函数/源行 (lldb) image list # 已加载镜像（dylib 基址表） (lldb) image lookup -rn dispatch # 正则匹配符号stripped 二进制用
image lookup -a反查地址归属模块，配合image dump symtab- 模块基址:
image list -o加偏移列——ASLR 下每次运行基址不同，脚本里先拿基址再算绝对地址（见 [[gotchas]]）
- 模块基址:
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 130 lines · 38 tokens per session scan B 21526554db05
re-lldb is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 2,302 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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