Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-macosgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-macos)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-macos"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-macos/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-macos"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-macos.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 29 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 32 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 51 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 53 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.02553 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01277 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00511 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00255 |
Grade A, and why
re-macos scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
macOS 应用逆向
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：macOS 原生/闭源应用（.app/.dylib/.framework）、带签名公证与沙箱的目标、钥匙串/Secure Enclave 硬件密钥场景
- 用：授权/分发状态判定——签名者、公证、hardened runtime、Team ID 是谁（分发面/信任面分析）
- 用：信任链问题——Dylib Hijacking、注入面、TCC 依赖（哪些隐私能力被请求/使用）
- 不用：iOS 应用（转 [[re-ios]]）；纯 Mach-O 格式解析（转 [[re-format-macho]]）
- 不用：Linux/Windows 目标（各走 [[re-gdb]] / [[re-x64dbg]]）
- 不用：只想抓网络流量/文件行为（无 macOS 特有面时走 [[re-behavior]] / [[re-netcap]] 通用路径）
- 注意：TCC 与钥匙串数据属系统隐私范畴，只读分析不导出内容（红线）
工具准备
codesign / spctl / otool / lipo（签名与 Mach-O 工具，macOS 内置）
- macOS: 系统自带（Xcode 命令行工具
xcode-select --install） - Linux: 可静态分析 Mach-O（
llvm-otool，brew install llvm或发行版 llvm 包），签名解析受限 - 验证:
codesign --version、macOS:otool --version；Linux:llvm-otool --version
plutil / xattr（Info.plist 与 quarantine 检查，macOS 内置）
- 验证:
plutil -help、xattr -h - 用途: Info.plist 键解析（
plutil -p）；com.apple.quarantine扩展属性决定 Gatekeeper 是否拦截
Hopper / IDA / Ghidra（反编译底座）
- 安装与验证见 [[re-ida]] / [[re-ghidra]]
lldb（动态调试）
- 安装与验证见 [[re-lldb]]；attach 前先处理 PT_DENY_ATTACH（步骤 6）
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步产物存档（路径 + sha256，见 [[re-triage]]）。签名/entitlements 信息按 [[analysis-contract]] 契约记录。
-
包结构与签名检查：
file Sample.app/Contents/MacOS/Sample codesign -dv Sample.app 2>&1 | head # 签名者/Team ID（要求需 `-d -r-` 查看） spctl -a -vv Sample.app 2>&1 # 公证状态（Gatekeeper） defaults read Sample.app/Contents/Info.plist # Info.plist 关键键- 关注：签名者（Apple 开发者/分发证书）、Team ID、CDHash、Hardened Runtime（runtime 标志）、Info.plist 的 CFBundleIdentifier/版本/最低系统版本
- 架构确认：
file输出/x86_64 与 arm64 通用二进制（lipo -archs）——决定反编译与动态环境（Apple Silicon 上 arm64e 有 PAC 差异，见 [[gotchas]]） - 公证派生检查：
spctl -a通过不保证本地有 staple——xcrun stapler validate Sample.app查票证是否随包 - 下载来源检查：
xattr -l Sample.app看com.apple.quarantine（Gatekeeper 拦不拦、来源 URL）
-
entitlements 与沙箱：
codesign -d --entitlements :- Sample.app 2>&1 | head -30- 关键键分组：
com.apple.security.app-sandbox（沙箱总开关）、network.client/server（网络）、files.user-selected.*（用户选文件）、device.camera/microphone（设备）、application-groups（组共享）、cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables/cs.disable-library-validation（注入面）、get-task-allow（调试权限，发布版不应有） - 沙箱 profile 决定能力边界——分析授权逻辑与攻击面时先看 entitlements 清单，动态行为再交叉验证
- 异常信号：发布版带
get-task-allow（本应只用于开发调试）或越权组合（如无 UI 却开device.camera）——记录为可疑项进结论
- 关键键分组：
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 119 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 12a827edf632
re-macos is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 2,553 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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