Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/duc01226/EasyPlatformnpx agentmods add skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-initWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-init)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-init"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-init.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-init"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/project-init.svg?style=web" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="15"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 48 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 19 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Tool Misuse · line 169 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Prompt Injection · line 242 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Agent Snooping · line 288 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Prompt Injection · line 294 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 311 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 352 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 370 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 88 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 159 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 92 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 147 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 150 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 151 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 152 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 154 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 155 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 156 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 157 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 158 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.12060 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.06030 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.02412 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.01206 |
Grade A, and why
project-init scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 480 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Codex compatibility note:
- Invoke repository skills with
$skill-namein Codex; this mirrored copy rewrites legacy Claude/skill-namereferences.- Task tracker mandate: BEFORE executing any workflow or skill step, create/update task tracking for all steps and keep it synchronized as progress changes.
- User-question prompts mean to ask the user directly in Codex.
- Ignore Claude-specific mode-switch instructions when they appear.
- Strict execution contract: when a user explicitly invokes a skill, execute that skill protocol as written.
- Subagent authorization: when a skill is user-invoked or AI-detected and its protocol requires subagents, that skill activation authorizes use of the required
spawn_agentsubagent(s) for that task.- Do not skip, reorder, or merge protocol steps unless the user explicitly approves the deviation first.
- For workflow skills, execute each listed child-skill step explicitly and report step-by-step evidence.
- If a required step/tool cannot run in this environment, stop and ask the user before adapting.
Codex Project-Reference Loading (No Hooks)
Codex uses static project-reference loading instead of runtime-injected project docs. When coding, planning, debugging, testing, or reviewing, open project docs explicitly using this routing.
Always read:
docs/project-config.json(project-specific paths, commands, modules, and workflow/test settings)docs/project-reference/docs-index-reference.md(routes to the fulldocs/project-reference/*catalog)docs/project-reference/lessons.md(always-on guardrails and anti-patterns)
Missing/stale context route: If docs/project-config.json, the docs index, lessons.md, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, or any task-required reference doc is missing or stale, auto-run $project-init or the narrow setup route ($project-config, $docs-init, $scan-all, $scan --target=<key>, $claude-md-init) before ordinary project-specific work. If Codex mirrors or AGENTS.md are missing/stale, ask the user to run $sync-codex; do not auto-run it.
Situation-based docs:
- Project structure/architecture/tech-stack/deployment/setup (any layer — backend, frontend, or infra):
project-structure-reference.md - Backend/CQRS/API/domain/entity changes:
backend-patterns-reference.md,domain-entities-reference.md - Frontend/UI/styling/design-system:
frontend-patterns-reference.md,scss-styling-guide.md,design-system/README.md - Spec authoring,
docs/specs/pathing, or TC format:feature-spec-reference.md,spec-system-reference.md,spec-principles.md - Behavior/public-contract changes or spec-test-code sync:
workflow-spec-test-code-cycle-reference.mdplus the spec docs above - Derived spec indexes/ERDs/reimplementation guides:
spec-system-reference.mdand source Feature Specs underdocs/specs/ - Integration test implementation/review:
integration-test-reference.md - E2E test implementation/review:
e2e-test-reference.md - Code review/audit work:
code-review-rules.mdplus domain docs above based on changed files
Do not read all docs blindly. Start from docs-index-reference.md, then open only relevant files for the task.
[IMPORTANT] Create complete task plan before shell checks, scans, generators, edits, or skill calls. [IMPORTANT] After config exists, run
$scan-all+$workflow-code-to-specas post-config barrier; do not proceed until both return outcome/blocker/deferral. [IMPORTANT] After setup/review/verification is otherwise done, spawn background$graph-buildsub-agent and record outcome.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 480 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 964746854001
project-init is a skill published in the GitHub repository duc01226/EasyPlatform (9 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 12,060 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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