Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add edenfunf/promptc --skill securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/edenfunf/promptcWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/edenfunf/promptc/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/edenfunf/promptc/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/edenfunf/promptc/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/edenfunf/promptc/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/edenfunf/promptc/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00018 | $0.00313 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00125 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00063 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00031 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Security
SQL injection prevention
Always use parameterized queries for every database access. Never concatenate user-provided strings into SQL statements directly. This includes dynamic WHERE clauses, ORDER BY clauses, and table names.
Input validation
Validate and sanitize all user-provided data at the system boundary before it enters business logic. Reject inputs that do not match the expected shape, range, or type. Prefer allowlists over denylists for structured validation rules wherever possible.
Secrets handling
Secrets must never be committed to the repository under any circumstance. Use environment variables, a secrets manager, or a vault. Rotate any leaked credentials immediately and audit access logs after any disclosure event.
Logging
Never log secrets, personally identifiable information, or full request or response bodies. Scrub sensitive fields at the logging boundary using a structured logger. Use structured logging consistently across all services.
Authentication
Use well-audited authentication libraries; do not roll your own crypto. Rotate signing keys on a regular schedule. Expire idle sessions after a reasonable inactivity timeout.
Boundary discipline
Treat any data that crossed a network or process boundary as untrusted until proven otherwise. Apply the same scrutiny to data from other internal services as you would to data from the public internet. The threat model assumes lateral movement; act accordingly across every service-to-service hop in the system.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 48 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A ec6f3ba5cf81
security is a skill published in the GitHub repository edenfunf/promptc (2 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 313 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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information-architecture
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persona-acid-test
Stress-test a design through three lenses, confused user, skeptical engineer and impatient PM, before it goes to a stakeholder. Requires an actual design, an HTML file, Figma link or screenshot.