security

A set of project-wide rules for handling untrusted input, secrets, database queries, logs, and authentication. It includes practices such as parameterized SQL and environment-based secret storage.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it as guidance while writing or reviewing application code that accepts user input, accesses databases, manages secrets, records logs, or authenticates users.
Why use it?
It helps prevent common security mistakes, including SQL injection, leaked credentials, unsafe input handling, and sensitive data in logs.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/edenfunf/promptc/security
Any agent
npx skills add edenfunf/promptc --skill security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/edenfunf/promptc

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 18 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 313 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00018 $0.00313
Opus 5 $0.00009 $0.00156
Sonnet 5 $0.00004 $0.00063
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00031

Measured 2d ago against content hash ec6f3ba5cf81, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

examples/bloated-demo/.claude/skills/security/SKILL.md · 48 lines

What it actually says

Security

SQL injection prevention

Always use parameterized queries for every database access. Never concatenate user-provided strings into SQL statements directly. This includes dynamic WHERE clauses, ORDER BY clauses, and table names.

Input validation

Validate and sanitize all user-provided data at the system boundary before it enters business logic. Reject inputs that do not match the expected shape, range, or type. Prefer allowlists over denylists for structured validation rules wherever possible.

Secrets handling

Secrets must never be committed to the repository under any circumstance. Use environment variables, a secrets manager, or a vault. Rotate any leaked credentials immediately and audit access logs after any disclosure event.

Logging

Never log secrets, personally identifiable information, or full request or response bodies. Scrub sensitive fields at the logging boundary using a structured logger. Use structured logging consistently across all services.

Authentication

Use well-audited authentication libraries; do not roll your own crypto. Rotate signing keys on a regular schedule. Expire idle sessions after a reasonable inactivity timeout.

Boundary discipline

Treat any data that crossed a network or process boundary as untrusted until proven otherwise. Apply the same scrutiny to data from other internal services as you would to data from the public internet. The threat model assumes lateral movement; act accordingly across every service-to-service hop in the system.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 48 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A ec6f3ba5cf81

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security is a skill published in the GitHub repository edenfunf/promptc (2 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 313 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.