Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to egregore-labs/egregore. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/egregore-labs/egregore/main/.claude/skills/invite/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/egregore-labs/egregoreWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 56 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 156 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 157 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 171 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 276 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 308 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 314 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 73 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 76 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 83 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 91 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 128 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 175 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 277 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 320 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.03432 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.01716 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00686 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00343 |
Grade A, and why
invite scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
**Neo4j-first (connected mode only).** In connected mode, all queries via `bash bin/graph.sh query "..."`. No MCP. No direct curl to Neo4j. In local mode, Step 1b routes to Step 2L (GitHub API only) — Steps 2–4b (graph + How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 388 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Invite someone to this Egregore. Handles GitHub org invitation + Egregore setup link.
When to invoke
User says: "/invite ", "invite ", "add to the org", or any request to invite a new person to this Egregore.
Not this: removing a member → /delete-user.
Arguments: $ARGUMENTS (Required: GitHub username of the person to invite)
Execution rules
Neo4j-first (connected mode only). In connected mode, all queries via bash bin/graph.sh query "...". No MCP. No direct curl to Neo4j. In local mode, Step 1b routes to Step 2L (GitHub API only) — Steps 2–4b (graph + notify) are skipped entirely. Do NOT show any graph-related messaging in local mode (no "Person node created", no "recorded in graph", no Neo4j references).
Notifications use the plan → approve → dispatch flow in
.claude/context/notification-consent.md (connected mode only). No direct
curl to Telegram. Inviting the person is not notification consent.
CRITICAL: Suppress raw output. Never show raw JSON to the user. All bin/graph.sh and bin/notify.sh calls MUST capture output in a variable and only show formatted status lines.
CRITICAL: Never expose credentials in tool output.
- Never read tokens in a separate bash call — always inline.
- Never pass tokens as visible arguments — read from
.envinside the script. - All credential handling happens inside a single bash call that only outputs the formatted result.
Step 1: Validate
If $ARGUMENTS is empty, show usage and stop:
Usage: /invite <github-username>
Example: /invite newuser
Step 1b: Local mode detection
Check api_url from egregore.json:
API_URL=$(jq -r '.api_url // empty' egregore.json 2>/dev/null)
If api_url is empty → use LOCAL INVITE FLOW (Step 2L below). Skip Steps 2-4b entirely.
If api_url is set → use CONNECTED INVITE FLOW (Step 2 below).
Step 2L: Local mode invite (GitHub API only)
Run ONE bash call with description "Inviting {username} via GitHub":
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 388 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 2dd710042b09
invite is a skill published in the GitHub repository egregore-labs/egregore (282 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 3,432 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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