Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to egregore-labs/egregore. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/egregore-labs/egregore/main/.claude/skills/invite/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/egregore-labs/egregoreWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/invite.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 56 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 156 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 157 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 171 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 276 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 308 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 314 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 73 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 76 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 83 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 91 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 128 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 175 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 277 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 320 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.01051 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00420 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00210 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00105 |
Grade B, and why
invite scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 24d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
chmod 600 tmp/invite-message.md How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 143 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Egregore invite
Invite one future organization member through the Egregore Runtime. The GitHub username is a linked-provider alias used by today's access transport; it is not an Egregore account, actor, or membership identifier.
When to invoke
Invite someone to this Egregore — repository access plus a setup link when Connected. Use for /invite , 'invite ', or 'add to the org'; not member removal.
Input
Require one GitHub username. If it is missing, show and stop:
Usage: /invite <github-username>
Example: /invite newuser
Execute
Use the supplied GitHub username as {provider_username}; quote placeholders
in single quotes when you use them in a command, and write any single quote
inside a value as '\''. Run exactly one invitation transaction and save its
JSON receipt:
mkdir -p tmp
bash bin/invite.sh '{provider_username}' > tmp/invite-receipt.json
Read the fields needed to render the receipt:
jq -r '{status, provider_username, org_name, provider_status, memory_status, invite_url, join_command, group_link, manual_access_url, warnings} | to_entries[] | "\(.key): \(.value)"' tmp/invite-receipt.json
Use each printed field as its correspondingly named placeholder below.
The adapter resolves ActorContext, keeps AccountIdentity, ActorIdentity,
and OrgMembership separate, authorizes ADMINISTER before external effects,
and selects the current GitHub or Connected control-plane transport. It owns
credentials, repository grants, the provisional canonical invitation record,
path-scoped Git provenance, and sanitized error mapping. Do not call GitHub,
the Egregore API, graph, storage providers, or Git directly.
Connected service permission denials are authoritative. Explain that an
organization admin must invite the person and show manual_access_url when
the receipt contains one. Never infer permission from a GitHub username.
Render
For an accepted Connected invite with invite_url:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 24d ago Changed · -245 lines · +3 tokens per session scan A → B 26425a9debb6
- 1mo ago First seen · 388 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 2dd710042b09
invite is a skill published in the GitHub repository egregore-labs/egregore (293 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 1,051 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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Join and behave correctly in a Bothread room — a shared, human-governed space where you collaborate with other AI agents on one codebase. Use this when the user says they want you to join a Bothread session, gives you a Bothread session ID, or asks you to coordinate with other agents.
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mflow
Use when working in a repo that uses mflow, coordinating multiple AI agents/worktrees, setting up mflow sync, installing mflow MCP in Codex/Claude Code/Cursor/opencode, or before git operations where synced file changes may affect commits. Applies to CLI, MCP, room secrets, pause/resume, locks, status checks, and safe…