Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Encod3d-Sec/TORCH --skill hunt-cloudgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Encod3d-Sec/TORCHWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-cloud)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-cloud/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-cloud.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 29 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 64 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 66 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 29 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 68 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 30 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.01906 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00762 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00381 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00191 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-cloud scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 95 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hunt: Cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP)
Assumes hunt-core for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.
Wiki
qmd_query "cloud AWS Azure GCP metadata SSRF IAM privilege escalation credential discovery persistence" via wiki-search MCP
Hub: [[cloud-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[cloud-iam-attacks]]. Payload arsenal: wiki/payloads/imds-cloud-metadata.md.
Anchors: [[aws-metadata-ssrf]] (SSRF -> IMDS creds), [[azure-ad-iam]].
Billing and safety (cloud-specific)
hunt-core owns the scope gate. Cloud stacks three specifics on top of it:
- Scope is account / subscription / project IDs, not just hostnames. Confirm the ID is in scope before the first authenticated call.
- Every call is billed and logged (CloudTrail / Azure Activity / GCP Audit Logs). Enumeration is loud, costs the client, and mass API calls trip provider abuse detection (GuardDuty / Defender). Prefer read-only enumeration, keep call volume low, and create or delete NOTHING without RoE sign-off.
- Never spray IAM users (lockout + GuardDuty). Reuse keys from
loot.mdfirst.
Attack surface (ranked)
- Metadata SSRF - an app-side SSRF reaching
169.254.169.254/metadata.google.internalhands you instance/managed-identity creds. Highest-value chain. - Exposed keys -
.env,~/.aws/credentials, CI/CD vars, JS bundles, git history:AKIA*/ASIA*(AWS),AccountKey=(Azure),"type":"service_account"JSON (GCP). - Over-privileged roles - creds in hand whose IAM grants a privesc primitive (step 4).
- Public storage - S3
*.s3.amazonaws.com, Azure*.blob.core.windows.net, GCSstorage.googleapis.com/<bucket>. Ranked last: frequently non-sensitive, easy to over-claim.
Chaining: SSRF that reaches the metadata endpoint -> pull IMDS creds; this is a hand-off from / to hunt-ssrf (that skill owns reaching the endpoint, this one owns what the creds unlock). A leaked key -> IAM enumeration -> privesc chain (step 4).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 95 lines · 43 tokens per session scan E 4579d95a8ad5
hunt-cloud is a skill published in the GitHub repository Encod3d-Sec/TORCH (336 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 1,906 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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