hunt-macos

hunt-macos is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from Encod3d-Sec/TORCH. It costs 71 tokens per session (1,950 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A macOS security-testing guide covering protections such as TCC, SIP, Gatekeeper, AMFI, the keychain, XPC, application sandboxes, and code signing. It accounts for different starting points, such as an administrator or a sandboxed app.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to investigate macOS applications, services, keychain data, code-signing entitlements, XPC communication, TCC, SIP, Gatekeeper, and related privilege-escalation paths.
Why use it?
It helps choose tests that match the machine and the attacker's access level, especially when checking privilege escalation, sandbox escapes, or privacy-control bypasses.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Use it to investigate macOS applications, services, keychain data, code-signing entitlements, XPC communication, TCC, SIP, Gatekeeper, and related privilege-escalation paths.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add Encod3d-Sec/TORCH --skill hunt-macos
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Encod3d-Sec/TORCH

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for hunt-macos

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for hunt-macos

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/encod3d-sec/torch/hunt-macos.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 71 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,950 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 13
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 38
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 56
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 28
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 98
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 99
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 49
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 99
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00071 $0.01950
Opus 5.5 $0.00028 $0.00780
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00014 $0.00390
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00195

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 605649bb3808, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

hunt-macos scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/hunt/hunt-macos/SKILL.md · 117 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Hunt: macOS

Assumes hunt-core for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.

Wiki

qmd_query "macOS TCC SIP Gatekeeper AMFI keychain XPC dylib injection sandbox escape code signing entitlements" via wiki-search MCP

Hub: [[macos-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[macos-tcc]]. Payload arsenal: wiki/payloads/macos-app-injection.md. Anchors: [[macos-privesc]] (general privesc checklist), [[macos-keychain]] (credential/DB harvest).

Environment note

macOS boxes on THM/HTB are usually a VM (not real Apple hardware) - SIP/Gatekeeper/TCC still apply as shipped, but device-specific protections (Secure Enclave, T2) generally do not. Confirm root/admin vs a sandboxed app context before picking an escalation path - the sandbox-escape and TCC-bypass techniques below assume different starting points.

Attack surface signals

Detected via: SSH/service banner (Darwin, Mac OS X 10., macOS 1[1-5]), a .app bundle / .plist delivered as a foothold vector, Bonjour/mDNS (5353), ARD/screen-sharing (5900/3283), SMB served by smbd with a macOS-flavoured share layout, or a CTF prompt naming macOS/Darwin explicitly. Footholds: a delivered .pkg/.dmg/.app (installer/Gatekeeper abuse), a web app or service running as a low-priv user, physical/VNC/screen-sharing access to a logged-in session.

Rank the surface once you have a foothold:

  • TCC / SIP / Gatekeeper / AMFI - the macOS-specific security stack; a bypass here is the signature finding of this class and the primary path to protected data or unsigned code exec.
  • Keychain / credential loot - highest reward-per-effort; a login-keychain dump or a reused hash often beats grinding a hardened control (see chaining note).
  • XPC / dylib / library injection - inherit a privileged or entitled process's rights; the main local-privesc lever once enumeration finds a vulnerable service or a hijackable load path.
  • Sandbox escape - only relevant from a sandboxed app context; escapes to the full user context.
  • MDM / installer abuse - a .pkg postinstall runs as root at install time; MDM enrollment reaches the whole fleet. Highest blast radius when either is present.

Read the full file on GitHub · 117 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 117 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 605649bb3808

Subscribe to this mod's changes

hunt-macos is a skill published in the GitHub repository Encod3d-Sec/TORCH (336 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 1,950 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

local-ai-agents

Build local-first AI agents that run entirely on a developer workstation with Microsoft Foundry Local and Qwen function-calling models. Covers Small Language Models (SLMs), the OpenAI-compatible local endpoint, sandboxed local tools, local RAG with Chroma, local MCP servers, hybrid cloud/local routing, and the…

microsoft/ai-agents-for-beginners · 200 tokens

systematic-debugging

Use when encountering any bug, test failure, or unexpected behavior, before proposing fixes.

obra/superpowers · 21 tokens

next-cache-components-adoption

Turn on Cache Components in a Next.js app and resolve the blocking routes it surfaces. Use when the user wants to enable, adopt, or migrate to Cache Components, flip the cacheComponents flag, work through a flood of blocking-prerender / instant validation errors, run the cache-components-instant-false codemod, or…

vercel/next.js · 95 tokens

chat-pet-sprite-creation

Use when creating or changing VS Code chat pet sprite art, sprite sheets, state animations, eye treatments, Stable/Insiders variants, or pet transitions under src/vs/workbench/contrib/chat/browser/widget/media/chatPet.

microsoft/vscode · 53 tokens

cpu-profile-analysis

Analyze V8/Chrome CPU profiles (.cpuprofile) and DevTools trace files (Trace-.json). Use when: profiling performance, investigating slow functions, comparing code paths, finding bottlenecks, analyzing timeToRequest, understanding call trees from sampling profiler data, analyzing layout/paint/rendering, investigating…

microsoft/vscode · 71 tokens

insight-error-page

Write or audit an insight-kind error page for the Next.js dev overlay. Use when creating a new errors/ .mdx page, auditing an existing one, or checking that a page matches the framework fix cards. Covers page structure, title alignment, FixCard cards with Copy prompt button, code snippets, terminology verification…

vercel/next.js · 83 tokens