Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add event4u-app/agent-config --skill git-workflowgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-configWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/event4u-app/agent-config/git-workflow)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/event4u-app/agent-config/git-workflow"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/event4u-app/agent-config/git-workflow/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/event4u-app/agent-config/git-workflow"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/event4u-app/agent-config/git-workflow.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 134 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high Tool Misuse · line 208 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 262 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 263 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 300 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 308 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 337 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 287 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 50 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 58 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 110 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.04707 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.02354 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00941 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00471 |
Grade A, and why
git-workflow scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 401 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
git-workflow
When to use
Use when preparing PRs, finishing branches, or following the team's Git workflow.
Do NOT use when:
- Code writing or review (use
php-coderorcode-reviewskill) - CI/CD pipeline changes (use
github-ciskill)
Live remote state first — never from memory
BEFORE ANY MERGE / PUSH / PR / BRANCH ACTION — OR ANY CLAIM OR QUESTION
ABOUT THEIR STATE — QUERY THE LIVE REMOTE. NEVER FROM MEMORY OR
CONVERSATION HISTORY. A PR MAY ALREADY BE MERGED OR CLOSED REMOTELY.
ASKING WHAT `gh pr view` ANSWERS IS A CHEAP QUESTION — CHECK, DON'T ASK.
The local branch view and the conversation's memory both go stale the moment anyone else — a maintainer, a parallel agent, an auto-merge rule — acts on the remote. Acting or asking on stale state is the recurring failure this section kills (canonical: asking "shall I merge these 4 PRs?" when all four were already merged remotely). Run first, every time:
git fetch origin --quiet
gh pr view <number> --json number,state,mergeStateStatus,mergedAt,baseRefName
# state: OPEN | MERGED | CLOSED — act only on the live value
- A state question is self-answering — never ask the user "is it merged?",
"is it mergeable?", "did it get pushed?", "is it still open?".
gh pr view/git fetchanswers it. Asking is a cheap question (perno-cheap-questions). MERGED/CLOSED→ there is nothing to merge or push; report the live state and stop — do not attempt the action.- Before merging → re-fetch and re-read
state+mergeStateStatusin the same turn; never merge on a status seen earlier in the conversation. - "Based on main" / "current" → prove it with
npx tsx node_modules/@event4u/agent-config/src/scripts/check_branch_freshness.ts; exit1⇒ the branch is behind and is not current — merge the base in, regenerate the derived files, then open the PR (see/create-pr§ 1b). Exit0means only that the gate did not refuse: read the line.branch is currentis the pass;NOT VERIFIEDmeans the base could not be reached and freshness is unknown — the gate exits0there on purpose so an offline push is not blocked, which makes reporting it as "current" the one misread it cannot catch. Exit0also covers the paths with nothing to check — a no-op in CI, a detached HEAD, standing on the base itself — and under--quieta genuine pass prints nothing, so run it without the flag when you need a verdict to read. Prefer it overgit rev-list --count HEAD..origin/main, which is wrong twice over: it pinsmainas the base for a branch whose PR may target something else, and it reads the local tracking ref — a fetch from earlier in the session, which is memory rather than a check. The gate asks the remote and resolves the base from the open PR.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed · +25 lines 58ea598dc316
- 7d ago First seen · 376 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A 36cfe6e93173
git-workflow is a skill published in the GitHub repository event4u-app/agent-config (10 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 4,707 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
work-unit-commits
Plan commits as reviewable work units. Trigger: implementation, commit splitting, chained PRs, or keeping tests and docs with code.
github-pr-review
Handles PR review comments and feedback resolution. Use when user wants to resolve PR comments, handle review feedback, fix review comments, address PR review, check review status, respond to reviewer, or verify PR readiness. Fetches comments via GitHub CLI, classifies by severity, applies fixes with user…
ac-qa-gh-pr-review
Reviews pull requests through a bounded shared worker-wave review flow, consolidated reporting, and user-confirmed gh pr review actions.
git-authoring
Authors and executes git work end to end — Conventional Commits messages, pull-request content, release notes, and pull-request review, plus the repository operations an engineer runs daily: branching, rebasing, squashing, cherry-picking, reverting, merge-conflict resolution, stashes, tags, remotes, and recovery…
git-hygiene-enforcer
Establishes git workflow guardrails including conventional commits, commit message hooks, branch naming conventions, PR templates, and code review processes. Provides hook configurations, workflow templates, and emergency bypass instructions. Use when users request "setup git hooks", "enforce commit conventions", "add…
requesting-code-review
Use when completing tasks, implementing major features, or before merging to verify work meets requirements.