Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Everyone-Needs-A-Copilot/claude-copilot. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Everyone-Needs-A-Copilot/claude-copilot/main/.claude/skills/security/threat-modeling/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Everyone-Needs-A-Copilot/claude-copilotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/everyone-needs-a-copilot/claude-copilot/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/everyone-needs-a-copilot/claude-copilot/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/everyone-needs-a-copilot/claude-copilot/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/everyone-needs-a-copilot/claude-copilot/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/everyone-needs-a-copilot/claude-copilot/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 136 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00123 | $0.01826 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00062 | $0.00913 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00365 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00183 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 182 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling
STRIDE threat identification, attack surface mapping, and deterministic coverage checking. Use this skill to produce a complete threat model — not just a list of obvious issues.
STRIDE enumeration is prose judgment — the model reasons through each category for each trust boundary and entry point. STRIDE coverage and optional DREAD scoring are deterministic — the script checks whether every category is represented and computes severity consistently.
Never claim a threat model is complete without running the coverage checker.
STRIDE Categories
Enumerate ALL six categories for every significant trust boundary. Absence is a finding.
| Letter | Category | Core Question |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing | Can an attacker impersonate a user, service, or system component? |
| T | Tampering | Can data be modified in transit, at rest, or during processing? |
| R | Repudiation | Can actions be denied without an audit trail? |
| I | Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak to unauthorized parties? |
| D | Denial of Service | Can availability be degraded or exhausted? |
| E | Elevation of Privilege | Can an attacker gain access beyond their authorization? |
Per-Category Design Questions
- Spoofing: How does the system verify caller identity at each trust boundary?
- Tampering: What validates that data has not been modified in transit or at rest?
- Repudiation: Is every sensitive action logged with enough context for forensic reconstruction?
- Information Disclosure: Does each response return only the minimum data needed?
- DoS: Are all unbounded operations (queries, loops, file reads) protected by limits?
- EoP: Is every privileged action checked against the authenticated user's actual permissions?
STRIDE Tag Reference (for the Coverage Checker)
Use these tags in the stride array of each finding:
| Tag | Category | Aliases accepted |
|---|---|---|
S |
Spoofing | "Spoofing" |
T |
Tampering | "Tampering" |
R2 |
Repudiation | "R2", "Rep", "Repudiation" |
I |
Information Disclosure | "I", "Information Disclosure" |
D3 |
Denial of Service | "D3", "DoS", "Denial of Service" |
E |
Elevation of Privilege | "E", "EoP", "Elevation of Privilege" |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 182 lines · 123 tokens per session scan A 7770da01b5bf
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository Everyone-Needs-A-Copilot/claude-copilot (13 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 123 tokens to every session and 1,826 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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