Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill pentest-detectiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-detection)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-detection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-detection.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 132 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.01529 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00764 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00306 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00153 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-detection scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 203 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
pentest-detection
Defensive detection-rule writing. Converts pentest findings into detection rules — to catch future attacks.
Triggers
- "write a Sigma rule"
- "Splunk SPL query"
- "KQL hunting query"
- "Sentinel rule"
- "YARA signature"
- "Suricata rule"
- "detection coverage analysis"
Sigma (Vendor-Agnostic)
title: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Execution
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell with -EncodedCommand flag, common in payloads
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
author: Security Team
date: 2026/05/15
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: powershell
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4104
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-EncodedCommand'
- '-enc '
- '-e '
filter:
User|startswith: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin scripts
level: high
Splunk SPL
index=windows EventCode=4104
| where match(ScriptBlockText, "-EncodedCommand|-enc\s|-e\s")
| stats count by Computer, User, ScriptBlockText
| where count > 1
| sort -count
Elastic KQL
event.code:"4104"
AND powershell.file.script_block_text:(*-EncodedCommand* OR *-enc * OR *-e *)
AND NOT user.name:"SYSTEM"
Microsoft Sentinel KQL
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4104
| where EventData has_any ("-EncodedCommand", "-enc ", "-e ")
| where Account != "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
| summarize count() by Computer, Account, EventData
| where count_ > 0
YARA (Malware/File Signature)
rule SuspiciousPowerShellLoader {
meta:
author = "Security Team"
date = "2026-05-15"
description = "Detects PowerShell with base64 + IEX pattern"
tags = "attack.t1059.001"
strings:
$iex = "IEX" nocase
$invoke = "Invoke-Expression" nocase
$b64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{50,}={0,2}/ // base64 blob >= 50 char
$download = "DownloadString" nocase
$bypass = "ExecutionPolicy Bypass" nocase
condition:
($iex or $invoke) and $b64 and ($download or $bypass)
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 203 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 0a6e58ccd3eb
pentest-detection is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 1,529 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
Other skills, from other repositories
pr-triage
4-phase PR backlog management with audit, deep code review, validated comments, and optional worktree setup. Use when triaging pull requests, catching up on pending code reviews, or managing a backlog of open PRs. Args: 'all' to review all, PR numbers to focus (e.g. '42 57'), 'en'/'fr' for language, no arg = audit…
audit-agents-skills
Audit Claude Code agents, skills, and commands for quality and production readiness. Use when evaluating skill quality, checking production readiness scores, or comparing agents against best-practice templates.
eval-agents
Audit Claude Code agents defined in .claude/agents/ for description specificity, model tier appropriateness, tools scoping, and system prompt quality. Detects dispatch ambiguity between agents, flags over-permissive tool grants, and checks for human-in-the-loop patterns that break programmatic orchestration. Use when…
issue-triage
3-phase issue backlog management with audit, deep analysis, and validated triage actions. Use when triaging GitHub issues, sorting bug reports, cleaning up stale tickets, or detecting duplicate issues. Args: 'all' to analyze all, issue numbers to focus (e.g. '42 57'), 'en'/'fr' for language, no arg = audit only.
check-cache-bugs
Audit Claude Code setup for cache bugs (CC#40524): sentinel, --resume/--continue, attribution header + ArkNill B3/B4/B5.
git-ai-archaeology
Analyze AI config evolution in a git repo. Use when mapping AI adoption history, finding when configs were first introduced, charting commit velocity by month, or identifying maturity phases in a project's AI tooling.