Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill pentest-privescgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-privesc)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-privesc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-privesc/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-privesc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-privesc.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 21 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 3 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Tool Misuse · line 37 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 38 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 40 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 42 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high YARA Match · line 42 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 43 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 129 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 130 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 130 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 131 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 3 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 26 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 40 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 42 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 143 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 147 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 37 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 55 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 153 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00074 | $0.01523 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00762 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00305 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00152 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-privesc scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
description: Privilege escalation methodology — Linux + Windows + container escape advisory. LinPEAS/WinPEAS analysis, SUID/capability abuse, kernel exploit selection. Triggers on privesc, privilege escalation, LinPEAS, Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 163 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
pentest-privesc
Linux + Windows + container privesc analysis. The user pastes LinPEAS/WinPEAS output; the skill prioritizes and suggests an exploit path.
Triggers
- "linpeas output"
- "winpeas output"
- "how to privesc"
- "SUID binary"
- "sudo abuse"
- "kernel exploit selection"
- "container escape"
- "UAC bypass"
Linux Privesc Vector List
| Vector | Detection | Exploit Method |
|---|---|---|
| SUID binary | find / -perm -4000 |
GTFOBins lookup |
| Capability | getcap -r / 2>/dev/null |
CAP_SETUID, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH |
| Sudo rule | sudo -l |
GTFOBins (NOPASSWD bins) |
| Writable /etc/passwd | ls -la /etc/passwd |
echo "evil:x:0:0..." >> |
| Writable cron | find /etc/cron* -writable |
Add a script |
| Path injection | sudo + relative path | PATH=/tmp:$PATH; ./binary |
| Kernel exploit | uname -a | exploit-db version match |
| LD_PRELOAD | sudo env_keep | malicious .so |
| Docker socket | /var/run/docker.sock readable | Container break |
| NFS no_root_squash | mount source | UID 0 file create |
| systemd timer writable | /etc/systemd/* | Timer override |
| Wildcard injection | tar/rsync wildcard | --checkpoint-action |
LinPEAS Output Analysis
# The user pastes the linpeas output, the skill reads it in this order:
1. SUID binary list -> filter exploitable per GTFOBins
2. Capability output -> CAP_SETUID / CAP_NET_ADMIN priority
3. Sudo rule -> NOPASSWD + GTFOBins
4. Cron + writable -> add-a-script path
5. PATH analysis -> is there a writable spot
6. Kernel version -> e.g. Dirty Pipe, OverlayFS, Sequoia
GTFOBins quick template: https://gtfobins.github.io — "shell", "sudo", "suid", "capabilities", "file write" filters.
Windows Privesc Vector
| Vector | Detection | Exploit |
|---|---|---|
| Unquoted service path | wmic service get name,pathname |
Space in path + binplant |
| AlwaysInstallElevated | reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer |
Elevation via MSI |
| Token impersonation | whoami /priv |
SeImpersonate / SeAssignPrimaryToken |
| Stored creds | cmdkey /list, runas /savecred |
Use the saved cred |
| Weak service ACL | accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * |
Service modify |
| Registry autorun | HKLM...\Run writable | Persistence + elevation |
| Scheduled task | schtasks /query |
Task command override |
| DLL hijacking | Process Monitor | Missing DLL plant |
| Local admin via UAC bypass | UAC level Auto | fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe |
| Print Spooler | PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675 | Local driver install |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 163 lines · 74 tokens per session scan A 49b636009060
pentest-privesc is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 1,523 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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issue-triage
3-phase issue backlog management with audit, deep analysis, and validated triage actions. Use when triaging GitHub issues, sorting bug reports, cleaning up stale tickets, or detecting duplicate issues. Args: 'all' to analyze all, issue numbers to focus (e.g. '42 57'), 'en'/'fr' for language, no arg = audit only.
git-ai-archaeology
Analyze AI config evolution in a git repo. Use when mapping AI adoption history, finding when configs were first introduced, charting commit velocity by month, or identifying maturity phases in a project's AI tooling.