Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to fb0sh/pentester. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fb0sh/pentester/main/.agents/skills/pentester-threat-model/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fb0sh/pentesterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fb0sh/pentester/pentester-threat-model)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fb0sh/pentester/pentester-threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fb0sh/pentester/pentester-threat-model/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fb0sh/pentester/pentester-threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fb0sh/pentester/pentester-threat-model.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.00428 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00171 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00086 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00043 |
Grade A, and why
pentester-threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
threat-model
Procedure: .agents/phases/02-threat-modeling.md
Schema: phase 2 in schema.json
Phase 2 has no scanner — it reasons over Phase 1/1b handoff summaries. This skill
only shapes that output so it becomes a gate, not free prose: the validator
checks that every critical_surface and priority_threat you hand off is
actually in threat-model.md, and nudges for a Signal column.
# Inputs (read-only): prior handoff summaries
node .agents/schema/validate-target-schema.js --print-session-packet 2
# Optional: confirm the signal keywords Phase 3 will LOOKUP with
node .agents/bin/lookup.js --phase 2 --keywords "<threat keywords>"
Write threat-model.md with a priority table that maps each threat to a signal
(a keyword from knowledge/signal-aliases.json) so Phase 3 resolves it directly:
## Priority threats
| Surface | Threat (STRIDE) | Signal | Phase-3 test |
|---------|-----------------|--------|--------------|
| http | Reflected XSS on `q` (Tampering) | xss | src-hunter --signal xss + Playwright PoC |
- Coverage gate (strict): every
critical_surfaces/priority_threatshandoff value must appear in the model. Signalvalues feedsrc-hunter/playbook.js --signalandlookup.jsin Phase 3.- Outputs / summary keys: schema.json only. End:
validate … --strict-summary --stamp-chain.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 41 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 4e3cee01b492
pentester-threat-model is a skill published in the GitHub repository fb0sh/pentester (24 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 428 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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