coordination

coordination is a skill for Claude Code from transilienceai/communitytools. It costs 24 tokens per session (1,790 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A coordination workflow for authorized penetration tests, where one coordinator manages testing agents for each target. It requires reading available source code before testing and recording the attack path and results.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps run security engagements by defining scope, forming and testing attack hypotheses, assigning executor agents, and validating possible findings.
Why use it?
It keeps reconnaissance, testing, validation, and reporting organized across multiple agents. It also limits what each spawned agent needs to know.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin. Also seen: mentions subagents; names the AskUserQuestion tool.

Part of the communitytools plugin — 48 skills, 5 commands, 9 agents, 1 hook shipped together

Good fit It helps run security engagements by defining scope, forming and testing attack hypotheses, assigning executor agents, and validating possible findings.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill coordination
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytools

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install communitytools, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 48 skills, 5 commands, 9 agents, 1 hook.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for coordination

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for coordination

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/coordination.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 24 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,790 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high YARA Match · line 84
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 10
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00024 $0.01790
Opus 5.5 $0.00010 $0.00716
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00005 $0.00358
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00179

Measured 1mo ago against content hash b895f3e1c82f, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

coordination scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/coordination/SKILL.md · 99 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 99 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Coordination

Runs as a spawned subagent (one per target). Within its own context, the coordinator holds engagement state inline — it does not delegate its thinking to further sub-subagents. Thinks before every action.

The parent orchestrator (main session) must not execute this workflow inline. If you find yourself doing P1-P5 in the main session, you skipped the spawn step in skills/hackthebox/SKILL.md (or the relevant platform skill) and the bookkeeping discipline is silently disabled.

Principle (Rule 0)

Source code first. Read all accessible source — application code, config, scripts, share contents — before any executor batch. Every answer is in the data you already have. Guessing without reading is the most common failure mode.

Workflow

P0: Ingest scope
 ↓
P1: Recon + read source code → write attack-chain.md → run preflight-checklist
 ↓
┌→ P2: Think — read chain + experiments.md, write 3 hypotheses (≥1 [wildcard]), pick 1-2 to test
│  P2b: Research (conditional) — see reference/creative-research.md
│  P3: Execute — spawn 1-2 executors with CHAIN_CONTEXT [+ RESEARCH_BRIEF]
│  P4: Integrate — materialize each candidate; **validate it now** (interleaved, strict per-finding,
│      fresh blind agents) → CONFIRMED | REJECTED | CURE→re-validate | DROPPED; update chain, revise theory
│      Coverage flips only on VALID (coverage-by-VALID); REJECTED/DROPPED classes stay pending → keep searching
│      No progress 1 batch → consider P2b · goal_attempts ≥ 3 on any conceptual goal → P4b
└─ loop (max 30 experiments; mandatory skeptic at experiments 5, 15, 25)

P4b: Reset — re-read all recon + source + chain. Creative Research (mandatory). Fresh theory.
P5: Engagement-thoroughness validation + Report (validated/ = VALID/REPAIRED only; drop-entirely, no gaps section)

Steps

  1. Recon + Source Code — read all accessible code (see formats/reconnaissance.md). Run pre-flight checklist (reference/preflight-checklist.md).
  2. Think — write 3 hypotheses to attack-chain.md, ≥1 tagged [wildcard]. Pick 1-2 to spawn.
  3. Test — 1-2 executors per batch, integrate before next.
  4. Validate (interleaved) — validate each candidate the instant INTEGRATE materializes it, on fresh blind agents (strict per-finding cure/drop loop → CONFIRMED | REJECTED | CURE | DROPPED); at loop end run the engagement-thoroughness validator (see reference/validator-role.md).
  5. Report — the VALID/REPAIRED findings in {OUTPUT_DIR}/artifacts/validated/ (all of them, by construction) → Transilience PDF via formats/transilience-report-style/SKILL.md.

Read the full file on GitHub · 99 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A b895f3e1c82f

Subscribe to this mod's changes

coordination is a skill published in the GitHub repository transilienceai/communitytools (591 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 1,790 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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