Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add wgpsec/AboutSecurity --skill gcp-workspace-pivotgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/wgpsec/AboutSecurityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/gcp-workspace-pivot)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/gcp-workspace-pivot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/gcp-workspace-pivot/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/gcp-workspace-pivot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/gcp-workspace-pivot.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 34 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 35 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 124 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 127 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00105 | $0.04213 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00042 | $0.01685 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00843 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00421 |
Grade A, and why
gcp-workspace-pivot scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ The source is not reproduced here
No licence file
A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 359 lines · 105 tokens per session scan A ddabc1b76cb5
gcp-workspace-pivot is a skill published in the GitHub repository wgpsec/AboutSecurity (1,805 stars, last pushed yesterday), with no licence file. It adds 105 tokens to every session and 4,213 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
terraform-state-leak
Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.
s3-takeover
Detect and claim dangling S3 buckets referenced by subdomains (CNAME → s3 hostnames where bucket no longer exists).
aws-iam-enum
Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
cloud-overview
Cloud exploitation lane — AWS IAM privesc, S3 takeover, k8s RBAC abuse, Terraform state leaks, cloud metadata pivoting.
gcp-org-escalation
GCP organization-level privilege escalation — cross-project pivoting, org policy bypass, service account impersonation chains, Terraform state secrets, and GKE cluster compromise. Escalate from single-project access to org-wide control.
cicd-secrets-exfil
Extracting CI secrets / OIDC tokens once you have code execution in a build job — echo/printenv exfil, log-masking bypass (base64, char-split, reversal), OIDC token abuse to assume cloud roles, GITHUBTOKEN / CIJOBTOKEN scope abuse, cache / artifact secret leakage, provenance pivot.