Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to fizzbee-io/fizzbee. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/main/.claude/skills/fizz-debug/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fizzbee-io/fizzbeeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/fizz-debug)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/fizz-debug"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/fizz-debug/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/fizz-debug"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fizzbee-io/fizzbee/fizz-debug.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 170 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.01634 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00654 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00327 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00163 |
Grade A, and why
fizz-debug scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 209 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
FizzBee Debugging Guide
Full references: ~/.claude/skills/fizzbee-docs/VERIFICATION_GUIDE.md, ~/.claude/skills/fizzbee-docs/GOTCHAS.md, ~/.claude/skills/fizzbee-docs/PERFORMANCE_GUIDE.md
When Model Checker Reports FAILED
A FAILED result means a safety assertion was violated. The output includes a counterexample trace.
Step 1: Read the failing trace
The output shows the sequence of actions that led to the violation. Look at:
- Which assertion failed (
AlwaysFoo,BalanceNonNegative, etc.) - What state variables were when it failed
- What action just ran before the failure
Step 2: Reproduce with a guided trace
Copy the failing action sequence and replay it:
fizz --trace "Node#0.RequestLock
Node#1.RequestLock
Node#0.DoWork" spec.fizz
Add --trace-extend 1 to see what enabled actions exist at each step:
fizz --trace "Node#0.RequestLock" --trace-extend 1 spec.fizz
Step 3: Reduce config to minimum
Shrink the state space so you can visualize it:
fizz --preinit-hook "N=1" spec.fizz
dot -Tsvg out/*/graph.dot -o graph.svg && open graph.svg
# Graph auto-generated when < 250 nodes
In the SVG, look for:
- The state where the assertion fails (highlighted)
- What changed in the step before failure
When Trace Is Incomplete
WARNING: Trace execution incomplete. Expected 8 links, executed 6 links.
A transition in your trace was blocked. Most common causes:
- A
requireguard failed — a condition you expected to be true wasn't - A symmetry limit was exceeded (e.g.,
limit=2but trace creates 3 distinct values) - The action name in the trace doesn't match (case-sensitive, exact match)
Debug by running the trace up to the failing step and using --trace-extend 1 to see what's actually enabled:
fizz --trace "Step1
Step2" --trace-extend 1 spec.fizz
When Behavior Seems Wrong (But PASSED)
The model may be over-constraining (silent pruning) or assertions may be tautological.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 209 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A c12806daae8f
fizz-debug is a skill published in the GitHub repository fizzbee-io/fizzbee (366 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 1,634 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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