Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins --skill audit-codebasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/audit-codebase)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/audit-codebase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/audit-codebase/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/audit-codebase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/audit-codebase.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 37 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 51 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 42 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Agent Snooping · line 221 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 229 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 233 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 237 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 225 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 94 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 140 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 190 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 191 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Agent Snooping · line 236 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00015 | $0.03906 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.01562 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00781 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00391 |
Grade B, and why
audit-codebase scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
HOOKS_CFG=$(grep -c "hooks" .claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null || echo "0") Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Enumerates other installed skillslowAgent snooping
Other skills' SKILL.md files reveal prompts, capabilities and secrets that should be invisible to peers.
SKILLS=$(find .claude/skills -name "*.md" 2>/dev/null | wc -l) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rn -E '\b(eval|exec|execSync|Function\(|setTimeout\([^,]*[+`]|setInterval\([^,]*[+`])' \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 344 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Codebase Health Audit
Score your codebase across 7 health categories, identify weak spots, and get a prioritized progression plan. Each category is scored 1-10 with specific, actionable findings.
Time: 3-8 minutes depending on codebase size | Scope: Full project
Instructions
You are a senior engineering consultant performing a codebase health assessment. Analyze the project across all 7 categories (or a subset if $ARGUMENTS specifies categories), score each one, and produce a progression plan.
If $ARGUMENTS contains category names (e.g., "secrets security tests"), only audit those categories. Otherwise, audit all 7.
Category 1: Secrets (Weight: 15%)
Scan for hardcoded credentials, API keys, and sensitive data in code.
# API keys and tokens in code
grep -rn --include="*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,php,yaml,yml,json,toml,env,cfg,ini,conf}" \
-E '(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey|secret[_-]?key|password|passwd|token|bearer)\s*[=:]\s*["'\''"][^"'\'']{8,}' \
--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git,dist,build,target,__pycache__,.venv} . 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Known provider patterns
grep -rn -E 'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|xox[bps]-[a-zA-Z0-9\-]{20,}' \
--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git,dist,build,target} . 2>/dev/null | head -10
# .env files committed
find . -name ".env*" -not -name ".env.example" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" -type f 2>/dev/null
# .gitignore coverage
[ -f ".gitignore" ] && {
for pattern in ".env" "*.pem" "*.key" "*.p12"; do
grep -q "$pattern" .gitignore 2>/dev/null && echo "OK: $pattern in .gitignore" || echo "MISSING: $pattern not in .gitignore"
done
}
Scoring:
- 10: Zero secrets, .gitignore covers all sensitive patterns, .env.example exists
- 7-9: No secrets in code, minor .gitignore gaps
- 4-6: 1-3 potential secrets found (may be false positives), or .env committed
- 1-3: Multiple secrets in code, private keys committed, no .gitignore protection
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 344 lines · 15 tokens per session scan B d2f3ef6ec32f
audit-codebase is a skill published in the GitHub repository FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins (42 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 15 tokens to every session and 3,906 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (reads agent configuration directories, enumerates other installed skills, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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self-improve
Improve the agent itself, or audit its recent performance - better skills, prompts, workflows, and config, plus a quality/reliability/memory-hygiene review of what it did and what failed.