security-audit

security-audit is a skill for Claude Code from FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide. It costs 12 tokens per session (2,805 once invoked), scanned A, original, CC-BY-SA-4.0.

A comprehensive security audit that produces a scored assessment of an application's security posture.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review security posture and identify areas that need attention.
Why use it?
It gives a broader view of security weaknesses and an overall way to judge risk.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: disable-model-invocation in frontmatter.

Good fit Use it to review security posture and identify areas that need attention.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit
About the project

Claude Code Ultimate Guide is a structured documentation project for learning how to build, operate, and govern coding agents with Claude Code. It serves developers and teams through guidance on agentic workflows, hooks, skills, MCP servers, security, and adoption. The catalogue entries are reusable skills, commands, agents, hooks, instructions, settings, and a plugin drawn from the guide's workflow materials.

FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide · 6,191 stars · on GitHub · cc.bruniaux.com

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide --skill security-audit
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for security-audit

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for security-audit

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide/security-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 12 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,805 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 70
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 75
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 86
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 87
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 75
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 87
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 90
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Agent Snooping · line 187
    Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 31
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 41
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 281
    npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
    Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
How audits are shown
Origin unknown No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00012 $0.02805
Opus 5.5 $0.00005 $0.01122
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00002 $0.00561
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00281

Measured 16d ago against content hash 4e11b8ff8e35, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-audit scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 16d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping

.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.

grep -c "hooks" .claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null || echo "No hooks in settings.json"

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

examples/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md · 285 lines

The source is not reproduced here

Licensed CC-BY-SA-4.0

The repository is licensed CC-BY-SA-4.0, which this catalogue does not treat as permission to reproduce the file. Read it at the source.

Read it on GitHub

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 16d ago Changed 4e11b8ff8e35
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 285 lines · 12 tokens per session scan A fbbaed170ae2

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide (6,191 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed CC-BY-SA-4.0. It adds 12 tokens to every session and 2,805 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (reads agent configuration directories). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.