Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/fmind/dot/threat-modelnpx skills add fmind/dot --skill threat-modelgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fmind/dotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fmind/dot/threat-model)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fmind/dot/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fmind/dot/threat-model.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00046 | $0.01009 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00504 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00202 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00101 |
Grade A, and why
threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 42 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Model
Identify the few plausible abuse paths that should change the design, plan, or verification strategy; secure runs the scanners and incident-response handles a live breach.
Workflow
- Scope the model: Name the system, environment, change, users, out-of-scope components, and the decisions this model must inform.
- Inventory assets: Credentials, identities, permissions, personal or proprietary data, money, availability, integrity, model context, audit evidence, and deployment authority.
- Map actors and entry points: Normal users, administrators, service accounts, maintainers, dependencies, insiders, compromised clients, automated agents, and external providers.
- Draw data and control flows: Trace creation, validation, authorization, storage, transformation, retrieval, logging, deletion, and external transfer; mark every trust, tenant, process, network, provider, and human-approval boundary.
- State invariants: Define what must always hold, such as tenant isolation, origin authentication, least privilege, idempotency, approval before mutation, or secrets never reaching logs.
- Generate abuse cases: At each boundary walk STRIDE (spoofing, tampering, repudiation, disclosure, denial of service, elevation) plus resource or spend exhaustion, context poisoning, and insecure defaults.
- Trace concrete paths: Connect attacker capability → entry point → missing or failed control → asset impact; discard category-only concerns with no plausible path.
- Assess controls: Record prevention, detection, response, and recovery controls and how each is verified; challenge silent failures, magic values, over-flexible algorithms, stringly typed permissions, and dangerous zero values.
- Rank risk: Weigh impact, exploitability, exposure, detectability, confidence, and reversibility; promote high-impact unknowns to verification tasks, not confirmed vulnerabilities.
- Feed delivery: Add required controls, tests, telemetry, rollout gates, incident actions, and residual-risk owners to the spec or implementation plan.
- Report: Scope and architecture summary; assets, actors, entry points, and trust boundaries; a data-flow or sequence diagram when it clarifies; security invariants; ranked abuse cases with concrete paths; existing and required controls; verification plan; residual risks, assumptions, and owner decisions.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 42 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 1670b29428d6
threat-model is a skill published in the GitHub repository fmind/dot (4 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,009 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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