forcedotcom/sf-skills is a collection of reusable instructions that help AI coding agents build and work with Salesforce applications and platform features. Developers use it for Agentforce agents, Lightning apps, Flow, Apex, SOQL, Lightning Web Components, and related Salesforce configuration. The catalogue entries are the repository’s skills, plugins, commands, MCP servers, and agents for AI tools that support skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add forcedotcom/sf-skills --skill dx-devops-promotegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/forcedotcom/sf-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/dx-devops-promote)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/dx-devops-promote"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/dx-devops-promote/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/dx-devops-promote"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/dx-devops-promote.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk warn
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 14 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 112 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 117 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 121 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 126 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 130 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 161 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 112 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 117 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 121 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 126 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 130 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 161 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00147 | $0.03488 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00059 | $0.01395 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00029 | $0.00698 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00349 |
Grade A, and why
dx-devops-promote scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 216 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DevOps Center Promotion
Drives the full promotion workflow in DevOps Center — validate, prepare, optionally combine, promote, and complete — moving work items through the release pipeline. Provides headless, --json-driven, idempotent operations for autonomous release workflows in CI. Every promotion begins with a mandatory validate step.
Scope
- In scope: Validate promotion preconditions, prepare a work item, combine work items that share metadata into one promotion, promote one or more work items or an entire source stage to a target stage, and complete the promotion
- Out of scope: Work item creation/status updates (use
dx-devops-work-item-manage), conflict detection, polling an existing promotion's status, pipeline or project setup (separate skills)
Required Inputs
Gather or infer before proceeding:
- Promotion target: one or more specific work items, or all approved work items in a source stage
- Target stage ID (required for every promotion command — validate, prepare, combine, promote, and complete):
--target-stage-id— the pipeline stage to promote to - Work item ID(s) or source stage ID — depending on the promotion target.
sf devops promotetakes--work-item-id(repeatable) XOR--stage-id - For combined promotion: a parent work item ID and one or more child work item IDs that share metadata
- Target org:
--target-org <alias>(required unless thetarget-orgconfig variable is set)
Defaults unless specified:
- Output format:
--jsonfor headless consumption - Test level: omit
--test-levelfor development-stage deploys (defaults toNoTestRun); useRunLocalTestsfor production-stage deploys with Apex
If the user gives a clear request ("promote work item 1fkxx… to stage 1QVxx…", "promote the QA stage to UAT", "combine these work items and promote"), proceed once you have the required IDs.
Workflow
All operations use sf devops CLI commands with --json output. Validate ALWAYS runs first. All promotion commands are keyed on record IDs, not work item names — resolve names to IDs first if needed.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 216 lines · 147 tokens per session scan A b6e686ec6200
dx-devops-promote is a skill published in the GitHub repository forcedotcom/sf-skills (1,097 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 147 tokens to every session and 3,488 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
release-announcement
Write a release announcement — changelog, blog post, in-app note, or social post — that leads with user impact, names the audience, and includes upgrade/migration steps without filler.
release-notes
Generate user-facing release notes from tickets, PRDs, or changelogs. Creates clear, engaging summaries organized by category (new features, improvements, fixes). Use when writing release notes, creating changelogs, announcing product updates, or summarizing what shipped.
multi-agent-release-manager
Cleans up the workspace, formats code, runs presubmit checks, and uploads CLs to Gerrit.
release-helper
Ensures configuration and code changes are released correctly. Use PROACTIVELY whenever you edit config.json, change any setting, or fix a configuration bug in this project, so the change reaches production.
pack-submit
Package one of this agent's own skills as a standalone community pack and submit it to the aeon registry as a PR.
updater_guide
Guidance for checking for and installing Row-Bot updates.