Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add forcedotcom/sf-skills --skill platform-models-api-configuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/forcedotcom/sf-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/platform-models-api-configure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/platform-models-api-configure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/platform-models-api-configure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/platform-models-api-configure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/platform-models-api-configure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 58 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 58 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- medium Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 21 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 54 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 122 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 150 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 60 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 69 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 110 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 117 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00144 | $0.02300 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00072 | $0.01150 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00460 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00230 |
Grade C, and why
platform-models-api-configure scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
1. Write `<project>/.claude/.orgjwt.env` (chmod 600), gitignore it: Reads agent configuration directoriesmediumAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
- Scope: project (`<cwd>/.claude/settings.json`, default) or user (`~/.claude/settings.json`) — reference-agent settings paths Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- tool: ["curl"] How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 152 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Salesforce Models API setup for an AI coding agent
The Salesforce Models API (https://api.salesforce.com/ai/gpt/v1) is
authenticated with a signed OrgJWT (obtained via client_credentials with
the sfap_api scope — see scripts/get-orgjwt.sh; no proxy). That auth and the
base URL are the same for any agent. How each agent then talks to the
endpoint is agent-specific: Anthropic clients (Claude Code and the Claude
Agent SDK) route through Bedrock mode (the env vars in Step 3), whereas
other agents (e.g. Codex) use their own client config against the same endpoint
and token — Bedrock mode does not apply to them.
The steps below are the Claude Code / Claude Agent SDK reference implementation (Bedrock mode + a JSON settings file + an API-key helper). For a non-Bedrock agent, reuse the OrgJWT auth (Step 1) and the base URL, and apply the equivalent client settings in that agent's own config location instead of the Bedrock env vars.
Bundled scripts are in scripts/. Path placeholders below: <SKILL> = the
absolute path to this skill's own directory (the folder containing this
SKILL.md; resolve it from the skill path in context). <ABS> = the absolute
path to the user's project root. Always emit fully resolved absolute paths —
the API-key helper runs from an undefined working directory, so relative paths
break it.
Prerequisite
A connected app in the org with the sfap_api OAuth scope and the
client_credentials flow enabled (consumer key/secret + a run-as user).
Setup steps: https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/ai/agentforce/guide/access-models-api-with-rest.html
curl + jq installed.
Inputs to collect
SF_INSTANCE_URL— org My Domain, e.g.https://acme.my.salesforce.comSF_CLIENT_ID,SF_CLIENT_SECRET— connected-app consumer key/secret- Models API base URL:
https://api.salesforce.com/ai/gpt/v1 - Model: a fully qualified
sfdc_ai__…name, e.g.sfdc_ai__DefaultBedrockAnthropicClaude46Sonnet(full list: https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/ai/agentforce/guide/supported-models.html) - Scope: project (
<cwd>/.claude/settings.json, default) or user (~/.claude/settings.json) — reference-agent settings paths - Headers —
<FEAT>=x-client-feature-id(defaultai-platform-models-connected-app),<APP>=x-sfdc-app-context(defaultEinsteinGPT). Used in the Step 2 verify curl and inANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 152 lines · 144 tokens per session scan C b171b5bcafb1
platform-models-api-configure is a skill published in the GitHub repository forcedotcom/sf-skills (987 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 144 tokens to every session and 2,300 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (asks for root, reads agent configuration directories, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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