Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add forcedotcom/sf-skills --skill service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assigngit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/forcedotcom/sf-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forcedotcom/sf-skills/service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 22 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 60 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 185 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 120 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00227 | $0.05399 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00113 | $0.02700 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00045 | $0.01080 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00540 |
Grade C, and why
service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variableshighData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
| Never extract the access token; never use an MCP dispatcher | Extracting a token leaks a bearer credential | How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 244 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Grant Runtime Access for an Activated ITSM Agent
An ITSM agent (Fulfiller or Employee) can be created and activated, yet fail the moment it's opened — its actions call platform features the user can't execute. This skill closes that gap after activation via two write-capable steps behind one confirmation:
- Runtime action-execution permissions. Detect which feature permission sets are provisioned, let the user pick a tier per feature (user/agent vs admin) and which user(s) to grant, then assign — license first when license-gated.
- A custom "Agent Access" permission set. Create (or reuse) Agent Access, grant the activated agents the user chooses (one
SetupEntityAccessper agent), then assign it to the same user(s).
The verified feature → tier → permset matrix lives in references/permset-topology.md. No org has all three features — assign only what is provisioned and report the rest as unavailable, never failing on an absent feature.
Every read and write runs through the Salesforce CLI (sf) — no metadata XML, no token extraction, no MCP.
Scope
- In scope: detecting which platform feature permsets are provisioned; per-feature tier selection; asking which user(s) to grant (running user offered, never silent) and resolving them; PSL-then-permset assignment (license-gated tiers) idempotently; creating/reusing the custom
Agent_Accesspermission set; adding aSetupEntityAccessgrant per chosen activated agent; assigningAgent_Accessto the user(s); verifying assignments by read-back. - Out of scope (owning skill parenthesized): the Agentforce for IT Service Go toggles / Studio config (
service-itsm-agentic-setup-agentforce-studio-configure); creating or activating the Employee (service-itsm-agentic-setup-employee-agent-configure) or Fulfiller (service-itsm-agentic-setup-fulfiller-agent-configure) agent; the Fulfiller activation action-surfacing gap (create/activate-time, not this runtime one —service-itsm-agentic-setup-itsm-agentforce-permset-assign); CMDB access (service-itsm-agentic-setup-cmdb-access-assign); generic non-ITSM permission-set assignment; authoring/editing feature permsets.
What ships with it
10 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/cli-invocation.md 9.7 KB
- references/helper-contracts.md 11 KB
- references/permset-topology.md 7.4 KB
- scripts/classify-activated-agents.mjs 4.3 KB runs code
- scripts/classify-agent-access-state.mjs 5.4 KB runs code
- scripts/classify-assignment-state.mjs 4.7 KB runs code
- scripts/classify-platform-permset-availability.mjs 6.3 KB runs code
- scripts/gate-unified-catalog-tiers.mjs 4.7 KB runs code
- scripts/rank-candidate-users.mjs 4.7 KB runs code
- scripts/resolve-target-user.mjs 3.0 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 244 lines · 227 tokens per session scan C 810d8a508d5d
service-itsm-agentic-setup-agent-runtime-access-assign is a skill published in the GitHub repository forcedotcom/sf-skills (987 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 227 tokens to every session and 5,399 once invoked, about $0.0011 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (harvests environment variables). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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