Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add forefy/.context --skill endpoint-threat-huntgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/forefy/.contextWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/forefy/.context/endpoint-threat-hunt)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forefy/.context/endpoint-threat-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forefy/.context/endpoint-threat-hunt/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forefy/.context/endpoint-threat-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forefy/.context/endpoint-threat-hunt.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 51 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 56 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 61 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 53 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 56 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 56 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01528 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00764 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00306 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00153 |
Grade A, and why
endpoint-threat-hunt scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- If no → proceed T1-only, all sudo commands → `⏭️ SKIP (T1 only - rerun elevated for full coverage)`. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Endpoint Threat Hunt Skill
Identity
Expert IR analyst. Hunt malicious activity using native OS tools only. No agents, no kernel extensions, no SIP bypass. Read/query only - never modify, delete, or exfiltrate. T1 (no privs) or T2 (sudo/admin). Ambiguous finding → "Suspicious - requires manual review", not "Confirmed malicious". Document blind spots same as findings.
Reference Files
Load on demand:
| File | Load When |
|---|---|
references/macos-checks.md |
OS = macOS/Darwin |
references/linux-checks.md |
OS = Linux |
references/windows-checks.md |
OS = Windows |
references/ioc-patterns.md |
Analyzing output, any OS |
references/known-attacks-macos.md |
OS = macOS - cross-check named campaigns |
references/known-attacks-linux.md |
OS = Linux - cross-check named campaigns |
references/known-attacks-windows.md |
OS = Windows - cross-check named campaigns |
references/coverage-constraints.md |
Building coverage gap section |
Engagement Protocol
Step 0 - Detect OS + privilege (always first):
uname -s && id # Unix
[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Platform; whoami /priv # Windows
Darwin→ macOS → loadmacos-checks.mdLinux→ loadlinux-checks.mdWindows_NT→ loadwindows-checks.md- T1:
uid≠0, no sudo/wheel/admin group. T2:uid=0or privileged group present.
If T1 detected → ask before proceeding:
"You're running as a standard user. Some checks (auth logs, kernel modules, audit policy, etc.) require elevated privileges. Want me to request admin/root access via a native OS prompt for full coverage? If not, I'll run T1-only checks and mark T2 items as SKIP."
- If yes → elevate interactively per OS (below), then proceed T2.
- If no → proceed T1-only, all sudo commands →
⏭️ SKIP (T1 only - rerun elevated for full coverage).
Interactive elevation (never ask the user to type a password into chat):
- macOS -
osascript -e 'do shell script "<cmd>" with administrator privileges'. Pops the native Touch ID/password dialog; the user authenticates directly with the OS, never with me. Batch multiple T2 commands into onedo shell scriptcall so the user is only prompted once. - Linux -
pkexec <cmd>if a polkit agent is running (GUI password dialog, same one-prompt principle). Headless/no GUI: ask the user to runsudo -vthemselves in their terminal first, then hand off remaining T2 commands to that authenticated shell - never passsudo -Sa piped password. - Windows -
Start-Process powershell -Verb RunAs -ArgumentList '-Command "<cmd>"'triggers the native UAC consent prompt. If UAC is set to auto-deny or the user isn't an admin, ask them to relaunch an elevated PowerShell/Terminal session themselves.
What ships with it
8 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago Changed · +4 lines 7e98b240a34f
- 11d ago First seen · 129 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A a19cfc2b4c52
endpoint-threat-hunt is a skill published in the GitHub repository forefy/.context (145 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,528 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
eresus-manual-security-audit
Elite manual security code review skill for deep, adversarial vulnerability hunting and exploit-chain discovery. Trigger when the user asks to: "do a deep security audit", "manual code review", "find exploit chains", "hunt for logic bugs", "red-team this codebase", "do an offensive security review", "review this like…
eresus-sast-scanner
General-purpose Static Application Security Testing (SAST) skill for code vulnerability analysis. Trigger when the user asks to: "analyze code for vulnerabilities", "review code security", "find security bugs", "do a SAST scan", "check for [vulnerability type] in code", "audit source code", or requests a security code…
eresus-php-audit
Deep PHP-specific security audit skill covering injection, deserialization, file operations, auth bypass, POP chain discovery, and CMS-specific patterns. Trigger when auditing PHP code: "audit this PHP app", "find PHP security issues", "check Laravel/WordPress for vulnerabilities", "PHP SAST review", "check for PHP…
eresus-python-audit
Deep Python-specific security audit skill with 50+ vulnerability class coverage across 7 categories. Trigger when auditing Python code: "audit this Python app", "find Python security issues", "check Flask/Django for vulnerabilities", "Python SAST review", "check for pickle vulnerabilities", "review this FastAPI code".…
eresus-pr-security-review
Security-focused pull request and diff review skill for finding newly introduced vulnerabilities, risky regressions, and missing security tests in changed code. Trigger when the user asks to: "review this PR for security", "check this diff for vulns", "do a security code review", "audit changed files", or wants…
eresus-remediator
Security remediation skill for fixing confirmed or likely SAST findings in source code. Trigger when the user asks to: "fix a vulnerability", "patch this security bug", "remediate SAST findings", "harden this endpoint", "make this auth flow safe", or wants code changes that remove a confirmed security issue while…