GBrain is a memory and retrieval layer for AI agents that searches, connects, and synthesizes information from stored sources. It is used to give coding agents and autonomous agents access to knowledge beyond their current code, including shared company information with access controls. The catalogue add-ons help agents operate GBrain and connect it to agent workflows.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/garrytan/gbrainnpx agentmods add skills/garrytan/gbrain/company-brainifyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/garrytan/gbrain/company-brainify)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/garrytan/gbrain/company-brainify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/garrytan/gbrain/company-brainify.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 146 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high Memory Poisoning · line 318 Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
- high Tool Misuse · line 434 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 487 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 460 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 515 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 515 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 515 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 196 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 362 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 491 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 547 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 548 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00100 | $0.08660 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00050 | $0.04330 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01732 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00866 |
Grade D, and why
company-brainify scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
mkdir -p "$STAGING" && chmod 700 "$STAGING" Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
rm -rf .git/filter-repo How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 704 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
company-brainify — Personal → Team-Brain Sanitization
Convention: see conventions/brain-first.md — discovery runs through the brain's own retrieval, not filesystem guesswork. The grep pipelines below TRIAGE;
gbrain queryfinds what keyword patterns miss.Convention: see conventions/test-before-bulk.md — sanitize 3-5 files, read the output yourself, then ramp. A bad bulk sanitization pass is worse than none: it looks done and isn't.
Convention: see conventions/regex-discipline.md — "is this sensitive?" is a judgment call, so the model decides per file. The grep patterns are earned triage/verification tools, never the judge.
Convention: see _brain-filing-rules.md — edits stay in the page's existing directory; the deletion log files date-keyed under
daily/.
The Problem
Personal brains accumulate everything — company knowledge, meeting notes,
internal assessments, compensation details, management strategy, candid
opinions about the people you work with. When you stand up a shared team
brain from that personal brain (see docs/architecture/brains-and-sources.md
for the team-mount topology), all of that has to go. The knowledge is
valuable; the sensitive metadata is a liability.
Clean working-tree files alone are NOT enough: git history still carries every pre-sanitization version, and gbrain takes/facts carry evaluative claims outside the page prose. This skill handles all three surfaces — pages, takes/facts, and history.
When to Use
- Standing up a shared company brain from a founder/exec's personal brain
- Auditing an existing shared brain for sensitive content that shouldn't be there
- Onboarding new team members to a brain repo that must be verified clean first
- Periodic hygiene pass on a shared brain that re-accumulates sensitive data
What Gets Removed
Always strip (non-negotiable)
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed · +16 lines 6f39e2ae59e6
- 9d ago First seen · 688 lines · 100 tokens per session scan D ae4837251264
company-brainify is a skill published in the GitHub repository garrytan/gbrain (29,702 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 100 tokens to every session and 8,660 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
mem0-oss-to-platform
Plan and then execute a migration of a project from the mem0 open-source / self-hosted SDK (the local Memory class) to the mem0 Platform / hosted / managed SDK (the MemoryClient class). Use this whenever a developer wants to move, switch, or migrate their mem0 usage off OSS/self-hosted to the hosted API — e.g.…
Cortex
Operate Cortex, the LifeOS memory system — the typed Knowledge Archive (People, Companies, Ideas, Research with typed related: links) plus recall of prior work sessions, ISAs, and conversations. Search, add, harvest, develop, ingest, distill, graph-navigate, recall. USE WHEN cortex, knowledge, knowledge base, search…
memory
Use when the user asks to remember, recall, forget, update, search, or inspect durable OpenSquilla memory, including profile facts in USER.md and long-term notes in MEMORY.md or memory//.md.
ha-data-stores
Map of Hope Agent's local data stores and safe read-only query workflow. Use when the user asks where Hope Agent stores data, wants to inspect sessions/messages/memory/logs/background jobs/knowledge indexes/settings, asks the model to query local app data, or debugging requires checking persisted state. Trigger…
establishing-project-context
Use when the user asks to establish shared project language, or project work exposes a conflicting, renamed, or deprecated domain term that needs active semantic modeling. Routine small tasks stay on the fast path.
shellm
Reference for the shellm system — recursive LLM shell, identity management, memory, skills, trajectory, and all CLI tools. Use when working on shellm itself, debugging agent behavior, or understanding how the pieces fit together.