deploy-compose

A deployment guide for Docker Compose services, separating automatically synchronized configuration from secrets that must be delivered manually.

In plain words
What is it for?
Changing Compose and related service configuration, checking image tags and pullability, validating GPU Compose files, and investigating deployments that did not land.
Why use it?
It clarifies which changes reach core-01 through CI, which GPU checks only validate files, and which deployment steps require human action.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/getklai/klai/deploy-compose
Any agent
npx skills add GetKlai/klai --skill deploy-compose
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/GetKlai/klai

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 69 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 690 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00069 $0.00690
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.00345
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00138
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00069

Measured 2d ago against content hash 95aa7c2356cc, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

deploy-compose scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.agents/skills/deploy-compose/SKILL.md · 39 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 39 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Deploy flow (compose → core-01)

Two separate halves. Config is CI-synced; secrets are pushed manually.

Half 1 — config sync (automatic, CI)

.github/workflows/deploy-compose.yml runs on pushes to main that touch deploy/docker-compose.yml, deploy/docker-compose.override.yml, the listed core-01 config paths, deploy/scripts/**, its smoke test, or the workflow itself:

  1. Validates image tags + pullability (deploy-image-check skill) and LibreChat patch drift — a failure here stops the deploy before anything reaches the server.
  2. SSH-syncs the compose file + configs to core-01 and runs scripts/smoke-docker-socket-proxy.sh. That post-deploy smoke test currently warns on failure but is deliberately non-blocking.

For those exact core-01 paths, merging to main is the config deploy. Other code changes use their own service workflows.

GPU Compose — validation only

.github/workflows/validate-gpu-compose.yml validates deploy/docker-compose.gpu.yml on pull requests and pushes to main. It checks Compose syntax, pinned Vexa tags, and anonymous image pullability. It performs no SSH, sync, or deploy to gpu-01. Follow the relevant runbook and obtain explicit approval before any gpu-01 mutation.

Half 2 — secrets (manual, deploy.sh)

deploy/deploy.sh [service] handles the monorepo's secrets side only: it decrypts .sops env files locally (needs ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt or $SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE) and pipes them to the configured server over SSH. The compose file itself is version-controlled and contains no secrets. Use deploy/SECRETS_MATRIX.md for scope.

Servers

Topology, IPs, and access live in klai-infra/SERVERS.md — that file is the source of truth, don't duplicate it. Key facts: app services run on core-01; GPU services (incl. the locally-built transcription-service) run on gpu-01 and are reverse-tunneled to core-01 via autossh (/opt/klai/gpu-tunnel-key on core-01; core-01 reaches them at 172.18.0.1:<port>).

When a deploy did not land

Read the full file on GitHub · 39 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 39 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 95aa7c2356cc

Subscribe to this mod's changes

deploy-compose is a skill published in the GitHub repository GetKlai/klai (11 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 690 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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