Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/getklai/klai/deploy-image-checknpx skills add GetKlai/klai --skill deploy-image-checkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/GetKlai/klaiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/getklai/klai/deploy-image-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/getklai/klai/deploy-image-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/getklai/klai/deploy-image-check.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00050 | $0.00548 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00274 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00110 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
deploy-image-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Deploy image check (pinned + pullable)
Two scripts guard every vexaai/<svc>:<tag> reference in deploy/docker-compose.yml and deploy/docker-compose.gpu.yml. Run both before committing compose changes:
sh deploy/check-image-tags.sh # tag FORM: pinned only
sh deploy/check-image-pullable.sh # tag EXISTENCE: manifest on registry
They are wired into .githooks/pre-commit. CI runs them in deploy-compose.yml before a core-01 sync and in validate-gpu-compose.yml for gpu-01 Compose changes. The GPU workflow validates only; it does not deploy.
Rules the scripts enforce
check-image-tags.sh — only three pinned tag forms are accepted:
- plain semver
X.Y.Z(upstream publishes to Docker Hub since v0.10.4) X.Y.Z-local-YYMMDD-HHMM(built on-host, preferred since 2026-05-03)X.Y.Z-YYMMDD-HHMM(legacy local convention, kept for rollback)
Mutable tags (latest, dev, staging) and -pending placeholders fail the commit.
check-image-pullable.sh — every ref must either have a manifest on the public registry (docker manifest inspect) or match a locally-built convention. Origin story: PR #269 shipped vexaai/transcription-service:0.10.6, a tag that does not exist upstream (that service is built locally on gpu-01) — it passed review and only broke at docker compose pull time on the server.
The unauthenticated requirement
The script creates an empty temporary DOCKER_CONFIG and unsets DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG before every manifest request. It therefore ignores workstation credential helpers and CI registry logins. Do not remove that isolation: the check must prove the image is publicly pullable, not merely pullable with a developer account.
When a check fails
- Tag typo / never-published upstream tag → fix to a tag that exists on Docker Hub.
- Genuinely locally-built image → rename the tag to
X.Y.Z-local-YYMMDD-HHMM. - Do not bypass by adding the ref to an ignore list — neither script has one, by design.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 37 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A 511c0bcc7349
deploy-image-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository GetKlai/klai (11 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 548 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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