Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add getsentry/warden-skills --skill wrdn-data-exfilgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/getsentry/warden-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/getsentry/warden-skills/wrdn-data-exfil)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/getsentry/warden-skills/wrdn-data-exfil"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/getsentry/warden-skills/wrdn-data-exfil/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/getsentry/warden-skills/wrdn-data-exfil"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/getsentry/warden-skills/wrdn-data-exfil.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 80 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 80 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 21 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00118 | $0.03997 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.01998 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00799 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00400 |
Grade B, and why
wrdn-data-exfil scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
High-value internal targets: `169.254.169.254` (AWS/Azure metadata), `metadata.google.internal` (GCP), `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`. Real: Capital One 2019, Exchange CV Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Identify the sink.** Is it actually dangerous? `requests.get("https://api.partner.com/foo")` with a hardcoded URL is not SSRF. `requests.get(user_url)` is. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 317 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security engineer. You hunt bugs where data leaves a trust boundary it shouldn't cross. These are the findings that produce data breaches, credential theft, and "we found our internal data on the web" incidents.
The abstract shape is constant across languages:
untrusted source ──▶ (missing validation / unsafe API) ──▶ data-disclosure sink
This skill covers cases where the primary impact is data leaving a boundary. Some primitives straddle multiple impact classes: SSRF can pivot from data read to IAM credential theft to RCE, and XXE can read files or reach gadget chains. Report here only when the data-exfiltration path is concrete.
Trace. Do Not Skim.
The sink tells you what could happen. The source tells you whether it will. Trace before reporting.
- Identify the sink. Is it actually dangerous?
requests.get("https://api.partner.com/foo")with a hardcoded URL is not SSRF.requests.get(user_url)is. - Identify the source. Values from
request.body,request.query,request.headers, parsed webhook payloads, third-party API responses, user-controlled DB fields are untrusted. Hardcoded constants and server-derived values are not. - Trace the path. Read the function, the caller, and whatever allowlist, IP check, or schema validator sits between. An allowlist of exact hostnames is a defense; a substring prefix check is not.
- Check the library version. axios before CVE-2020-28168 follows redirects to internal IPs; lxml before CVE-2024-6508 resolves entities by default; Prisma
$queryRawUnsafewas always unsafe; Sequelizeliteral()interpolates even withreplacementsin pre-patch versions. - Use the shell.
git log -p <file>shows whether a guard was removed.rg -n '<sink>'enumerates siblings. - Detect the framework. Load the matching reference.
If the trace cannot be completed with the files at hand, drop the finding or report with lower confidence.
References
Load on demand.
By sink class
What ships with it
13 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/data-leakage.md 9.3 KB
- references/django.md 4.7 KB
- references/express.md 4.3 KB
- references/fastapi.md 3.8 KB
- references/flask.md 2.5 KB
- references/getsentry.md 7.8 KB
- references/graphql.md 6.3 KB
- references/nextjs.md 4.7 KB
- references/path-traversal.md 8.1 KB
- references/sentry.md 5.4 KB
- references/sql-injection.md 8.0 KB
- references/ssrf.md 10 KB
- references/xxe.md 7.7 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 317 lines · 118 tokens per session scan B 9b5b30bad05e
wrdn-data-exfil is a skill published in the GitHub repository getsentry/warden-skills (57 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 118 tokens to every session and 3,997 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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