Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add GoldenWing-360/claude-security-skills --skill kubernetes-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/GoldenWing-360/claude-security-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/goldenwing-360/claude-security-skills/kubernetes-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/goldenwing-360/claude-security-skills/kubernetes-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/goldenwing-360/claude-security-skills/kubernetes-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/goldenwing-360/claude-security-skills/kubernetes-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/goldenwing-360/claude-security-skills/kubernetes-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00088 | $0.03504 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.01752 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00701 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00350 |
Grade A, and why
kubernetes-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 353 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes Security
A pragmatic baseline for a single Kubernetes cluster running a small-team workload. Skews toward "I have a cluster and need it to not be the cause of an incident" — not a full CIS Benchmark for regulated environments. Most managed-K8s providers ship sensible defaults at the control-plane layer; the data-plane (your workloads) is where the work is.
When to invoke
- Provisioning a new cluster
- Inheriting a cluster with no documented hardening
- Before adding a new tenant / team / workload to a shared cluster
- After a K8s security advisory affecting your version
- Periodic re-audit (quarterly)
- Multi-tenant SaaS where customer workloads share infrastructure
Step 1 — Cluster baseline
Before workload hardening, the cluster itself.
# What version? Is it supported?
kubectl version --short
# K8s has a ~14-month support window. Unsupported = unpatched CVEs.
# Who can reach the API?
kubectl cluster-info
# For managed clusters, check the provider's "API endpoint" access setting:
# - Private endpoint, restricted CIDRs, or behind a bastion is correct
# - "Public, open to 0.0.0.0/0" is a finding
# Audit log enabled?
# For EKS/GKE/AKS: check the cluster's "audit logging" / "control-plane logging" setting
# Self-hosted: --audit-log-path on the API server
Patterns:
- Restrict the API endpoint. Public + open is the worst default. Use private endpoint + bastion, or public + CIDR allowlist + IAM auth at minimum.
- Enable control-plane audit logging. Without it, an incident has no record. Ship to a log destination outside the cluster (so a compromise cannot wipe its own audit trail).
- Pin to a supported version, automate patching to within the support window.
- Encrypt etcd at rest. Default-on for EKS, GKE, AKS. Self-hosted: configure
--encryption-provider-config.
Step 2 — Pod Security Standards
Since K8s 1.25, Pod Security Admission is built-in. There are three policy levels:
| Level | What it allows | When to use |
|---|---|---|
| Privileged | Everything | System namespaces only (kube-system, ingress controllers that need it) |
| Baseline | No privileged escalation, no host networking, no hostPath | Default for most workloads |
| Restricted | The above plus: non-root user, read-only root filesystem, drop all capabilities, seccomp profile | Production application workloads |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 353 lines · 88 tokens per session scan A da8dbb07bea6
kubernetes-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository GoldenWing-360/claude-security-skills (17 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 3,504 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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