Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/goodsmileduck/claude-registry/aws-codepipeline-codebuildnpx skills add Goodsmileduck/claude-registry --skill aws-codepipeline-codebuildgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Goodsmileduck/claude-registryWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/goodsmileduck/claude-registry/aws-codepipeline-codebuild)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/goodsmileduck/claude-registry/aws-codepipeline-codebuild"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/goodsmileduck/claude-registry/aws-codepipeline-codebuild.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00123 | $0.04467 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00062 | $0.02233 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00893 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00447 |
Grade A, and why
aws-codepipeline-codebuild scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 381 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AWS CodePipeline + CodeBuild
These two services are tightly coupled in practice: CodePipeline orchestrates stages, CodeBuild does the build action. Most friction lives at the boundary (artifact handoff, IAM roles, source authentication).
When to invoke
Symptoms:
- CodeBuild fails immediately with
CannotPullContainerError: pull access deniedfor an ECR image. - A Lambda invoke action in CodePipeline hangs for 30+ minutes even though the function returns quickly.
npm ci/pip install/ Maven dependency resolution dominates build time and the configured cache isn't helping.- The source action shows OAuth-style GitHub auth and we want to migrate to the modern GitHub App.
- Cross-account deploy stage fails with assume-role errors.
- Build succeeds but the next stage receives empty / missing artifacts.
- A
buildspec.ymlreferenced in CodeBuild silently runs without env vars from Parameter Store / Secrets Manager. - Pipeline service role attached an AWS-managed policy and we want to scope it down.
Cross-cutting rules
- Always set
imagePullCredentialsTypeexplicitly when using ECR base images. Default (CODEBUILD) requires an ECR repository policy trustingcodebuild.amazonaws.com. SettingSERVICE_ROLEpulls under the project's IAM role — usually what you want. See ECR base images. - Lambda actions are async from CodePipeline's perspective. The Lambda MUST call
PutJobSuccessResult/PutJobFailureResultbefore returning. Returning is not signaling. See Lambda invoke action. - Never edit
buildspec.ymland the source CodeBuild project'sbuildspecfield at the same time — one shadows the other. The inlinebuildspecfield on the project (when set) overrides the file in source. Pick one; document which. - Pipeline service role and CodeBuild service role are different roles. Pipeline's role does NOT confer permissions on the build. Each build action has its own service role, set on the CodeBuild project (NOT the pipeline action).
- Artifact bucket is encrypted by default. Cross-account artifact reads require the destination account's role to have decrypt access on the source account's KMS key — and the key policy must grant cross-account use. Symptom of missing this:
AccessDeniedon artifact download even when bucket policy looks correct.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 381 lines · 123 tokens per session scan A 955e6eccad7f
aws-codepipeline-codebuild is a skill published in the GitHub repository Goodsmileduck/claude-registry (1 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 123 tokens to every session and 4,467 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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