Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Google-Health-API/google-health-cli --skill ghealth-sharedgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Google-Health-API/google-health-cliWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-health-api/google-health-cli/ghealth-shared)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-health-api/google-health-cli/ghealth-shared"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google-health-api/google-health-cli/ghealth-shared/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-health-api/google-health-cli/ghealth-shared"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google-health-api/google-health-cli/ghealth-shared.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 35 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 55 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 56 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 67 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 73 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 76 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 100 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 36 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 51 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 55 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 47 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 58 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 122 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.01709 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00855 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00342 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00171 |
Grade A, and why
ghealth-shared scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 147 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ghealth — Shared Prerequisites
Setup
ghealth setup # interactive wizard, run once
Six steps: GCP project ID, OAuth client_secret JSON (Desktop application), Health API enable, scope selection, browser-based OAuth, save profile.
Scriptable (skips prompts):
ghealth setup \
--project-id my-project \
--client-secret ~/Downloads/client_secret_123.json \
--scopes-preset readonly \
--skip-enable-api \
--no-prompt
Add --non-interactive-auth to skip the browser step and finish later with ghealth auth login --complete <code>.
Files written
All under ~/.config/ghealth/ (override with GHEALTH_CONFIG_DIR):
| File | Contents | Mode |
|---|---|---|
client_secret.json |
Your GCP OAuth client | 0600 |
credentials.json |
Access + refresh tokens (plaintext JSON) | 0600 |
pending_auth.json |
In-progress non-interactive flow state | 0600 |
config.toml |
Active profile (project, scopes, format) | 0600 |
Authentication
| Method | Usage |
|---|---|
| Stored credentials | ghealth auth login (default after setup) |
| Headless (no browser) | ghealth auth login --non-interactive → click URL → ghealth auth login --complete <code> |
| Move tokens between machines | ghealth auth export > creds.json → on target: ghealth auth import --file creds.json |
| Access token (no refresh) | export GHEALTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=ya29... |
| Credential file | export GHEALTH_CREDENTIALS_FILE=/path/to.json |
| ADC (GCP envs) | Automatic if available |
Precedence: env token > credential file > stored > ADC. Refresh tokens are persisted in credentials.json and refreshed automatically (1h access-token lifetime); a 401 from the API force-refreshes once before erroring.
Check: ghealth auth status. Exit codes:
- 0 — locally configured; does not make a network call. Expired stored tokens still exit 0 — the JSON reports
authenticated: false/expired: true - 2 —
client_secret.jsonpresent but no stored tokens (credentials.jsonmissing); runghealth auth login - 5 — no
client_secret.jsonat all; error carriesnext_steps[]for bootstrap (see below)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 147 lines · 22 tokens per session scan A bd5e8aab3dbd
ghealth-shared is a skill published in the GitHub repository Google-Health-API/google-health-cli (243 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 1,709 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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