Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hamzabellouch/agent-skills --skill supply-chain-security-sbom-slsagit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hamzabellouch/agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamzabellouch/agent-skills/supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamzabellouch/agent-skills/supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hamzabellouch/agent-skills/supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamzabellouch/agent-skills/supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hamzabellouch/agent-skills/supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.02341 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.01171 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00468 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00234 |
Grade B, and why
supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
run: curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
run: curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 256 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Security: SBOM, SLSA, & Artifact Attestation
Overview
This skill provides production-ready patterns, automation templates, and Zero-Trust validation gates for securing software supply chains. It establishes end-to-end provenance verification, artifact integrity signing using Sigstore/Cosign, and automated SBOM analysis against vulnerability intelligence feeds.
1. Core Architectural Principles & Zero-Trust Governance
- Explicit Provenance Verification: Never trust unverified build outputs. Every container image, binary, and package must present verifiable SLSA Level 3+ provenance signed by ephemeral OIDC tokens.
- Deterministic & Reproducible Builds: Strive for hermetic build execution environments where identical source inputs yield bit-for-bit identical outputs.
- Continuous Cryptographic Verification: Validate signatures, SBOM attestations, and vulnerability thresholds at admission control (Kubernetes Policy Engine / Kyverno / Gatekeeper) and before deployment.
- Least Privilege Build Identities: Build pipelines must operate with short-lived, identity-bound tokens (e.g., GitHub OIDC federated to cloud IAM) rather than static, long-lived credentials.
2. Pipeline Gates & Policy Enforcement
| Gate Phase | Tooling | Enforcement Rules |
|---|---|---|
| Source / Pre-Build | Git Commit Signing, Dependency-Check | Block unverified commits; block dependencies with known critical CVEs without approved exception annotations. |
| Build Time | SLSA Generator, Syft, Cosign | Generate SPDX/CycloneDX SBOM; produce in-toto provenance attestation; sign artifacts via Keyless Sigstore. |
| Post-Build Validation | Grype, Trivy, Cosign Verify | Block image pushing/deployment if unverified signatures exist or high/critical vulnerabilities violate SLA. |
| Deploy / Admission | Kyverno / Policy Controller | Enforce image signature verification, SLSA provenance check, and minimum required SBOM attestation. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 256 lines · 59 tokens per session scan B edc3620ec909
supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa is a skill published in the GitHub repository hamzabellouch/agent-skills (4 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 2,341 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
sbom-supply-chain
Generate, attach, and verify SBOMs (CycloneDX/SPDX) for container images; implement SLSA provenance; harden software supply chain.
sigstore-signing
Sign container images and artifacts with cosign (keyless via OIDC and key-based); verify signatures in CD pipelines and admission policies.
artifact-management
Manage container images, Helm charts, and build artifacts — registry organization, retention, promotion between environments.
helm-charts
Design, structure, and test production-grade Helm charts with multi-environment overlays.
pod-troubleshooting
Systematic diagnosis of Kubernetes pod failures — CrashLoopBackOff, OOMKilled, Pending, ImagePullBackOff, and service connectivity issues. Use when the user encounters pods not starting, container restart loops, scheduling failures, or service unreachability in a K8s cluster.
k8s-manifests
When writing K8s YAML, designing Helm charts, setting resource limits, configuring probes, or reviewing pod security.