Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add sawrus/agent-guides --skill sigstore-signinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sawrus/agent-guidesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/sigstore-signing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/sigstore-signing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/sigstore-signing/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/sigstore-signing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/sigstore-signing.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.01323 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00661 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00265 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00132 |
Grade A, and why
sigstore-signing scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 185 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: Sigstore / cosign Signing
Expertise: cosign keyless signing (Sigstore), key-based signing, signature verification, Kyverno/OPA enforcement, Rekor transparency log.
When to load
When setting up image signing in CI, verifying signatures before deploy, or enforcing signature policies in K8s admission.
Keyless Signing (OIDC — GitHub Actions)
# .github/workflows/sign.yml
jobs:
sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write # ← required for keyless OIDC signing
steps:
- name: Install cosign
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Build and push
id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
push: true
tags: ghcr.io/myorg/order-service:${{ github.sha }}
- name: Sign image (keyless)
run: |
cosign sign \
--yes \
ghcr.io/myorg/order-service@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
# Signature stored in Rekor transparency log
# No private key needed — OIDC token proves identity
Key-Based Signing (when OIDC not available)
# Generate signing key pair (do once; store private key in Vault)
cosign generate-key-pair
# Creates: cosign.key (private — store in Vault) + cosign.pub (public — commit to repo)
# Sign with key
cosign sign \
--key cosign.key \
registry.example.com/myorg/order-service:v1.2.3
# Sign in CI using secret
cosign sign \
--key env://COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY \ # inject from CI secret
registry.example.com/myorg/order-service:v1.2.3
Verification
# Verify keyless signature (GitHub Actions OIDC)
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/.*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
ghcr.io/myorg/order-service:v1.2.3
# Verify key-based signature
cosign verify \
--key cosign.pub \
registry.example.com/myorg/order-service:v1.2.3
# Verify and show full certificate info
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity-regexp ".*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
ghcr.io/myorg/order-service:v1.2.3 | jq '.[0].optional'
# Check Rekor transparency log entry
cosign verify \
--rekor-url https://rekor.sigstore.dev \
... | jq '.[0].rekorLogIndex'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 185 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A 4200f4380819
sigstore-signing is a skill published in the GitHub repository sawrus/agent-guides (17 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 1,323 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
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apple-container
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supply-chain-security-sbom-slsa
Comprehensive framework for software supply chain security incorporating Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) generation/validation, SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) provenance compliance, image signing with Cosign/Sigstore, and automated pipeline verification.