Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Harmeet10000/skills --skill optimizing-ef-core-queriesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Harmeet10000/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/harmeet10000/skills/optimizing-ef-core-queries)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/harmeet10000/skills/optimizing-ef-core-queries"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/harmeet10000/skills/optimizing-ef-core-queries/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/harmeet10000/skills/optimizing-ef-core-queries"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/harmeet10000/skills/optimizing-ef-core-queries.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00053 | $0.01377 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00551 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00275 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00138 |
Grade A, and why
optimizing-ef-core-queries scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- optimizing-ef-core-queries — 92% identical, 1 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 179 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Optimizing EF Core Queries
When to Use
- EF Core queries are slow or generating too many SQL statements
- Database CPU/IO is high due to ORM inefficiency
- N+1 query patterns are detected in logs
- Large result sets cause memory pressure
When Not to Use
- The user is using Dapper or raw ADO.NET (not EF Core)
- The performance issue is database-side (missing indexes, bad schema)
- The user is building a new data access layer from scratch
Inputs
| Input | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Slow EF Core queries | Yes | The LINQ queries or DbContext usage to optimize |
| SQL output or logs | No | EF Core generated SQL or query execution logs |
Workflow
Step 1: Enable query logging to see the actual SQL
// In Program.cs or DbContext configuration:
optionsBuilder
.UseSqlServer(connectionString)
.LogTo(Console.WriteLine, LogLevel.Information)
.EnableSensitiveDataLogging() // shows parameter values (dev only!)
.EnableDetailedErrors();
Or use the Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore log category:
{
"Logging": {
"LogLevel": {
"Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Database.Command": "Information"
}
}
}
Step 2: Fix N+1 query patterns
The #1 EF Core performance killer. Happens when loading related entities in a loop.
Before (N+1 — 1 query for orders + N queries for items):
var orders = await db.Orders.ToListAsync();
foreach (var order in orders)
{
// Each access triggers a lazy-load query!
var items = order.Items.Count;
}
After (eager loading — 1 or 2 queries total):
// Option 1: Include (JOIN)
var orders = await db.Orders
.Include(o => o.Items)
.ToListAsync();
// Option 2: Split query (separate SQL, avoids cartesian explosion)
var orders = await db.Orders
.Include(o => o.Items)
.AsSplitQuery()
.ToListAsync();
// Option 3: Explicit projection (best - only fetches needed columns)
var orderSummaries = await db.Orders
.Select(o => new OrderSummary
{
OrderId = o.Id,
Total = o.Items.Sum(i => i.Price),
ItemCount = o.Items.Count
})
.ToListAsync();
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 179 lines · 53 tokens per session scan A f5eb7b623031
optimizing-ef-core-queries is a skill published in the GitHub repository Harmeet10000/skills (7 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 1,377 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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