Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill csrfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/csrf)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/csrf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/csrf.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector fail
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
- high Prompt Injection · line 72 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 25 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.01660 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00830 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00332 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00166 |
Grade A, and why
csrf scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no-token=%{http_code}\n" -X POST "https://<TARGET>/account/email" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 124 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CSRF Playbook
Any state-changing endpoint (POST/PUT/DELETE, or GET with side effects) that trusts ambient cookies and lacks a per-request unguessable token is forgeable. Severity scales with the action: password/email change, fund transfer, role grant → account takeover (Critical). Read-only CSRF (no state change) → Info.
1. Detection — is the endpoint actually protected?
# Capture a real authenticated request first, then replay WITHOUT the token / Origin / Referer
COOKIE='session=...; remember=...'
# (a) Strip CSRF token — does it still succeed?
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no-token=%{http_code}\n" -X POST "https://<TARGET>/account/email" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data "[email protected]"
# (b) Send a clearly invalid token — is it validated?
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "junk-token=%{http_code}\n" -X POST "https://<TARGET>/account/email" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data "csrf=AAAAAAAA&[email protected]"
# (c) Swap another user's token in (token-not-bound-to-session)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "other-token=%{http_code}\n" -X POST "https://<TARGET>/account/email" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" --data "csrf=<TOKEN_FROM_ANOTHER_ACCOUNT>&[email protected]"
# (d) Origin / Referer header validation
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no-origin=%{http_code}\n" -X POST "https://<TARGET>/account/email" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" --data "csrf=<TOKEN>&[email protected]"
# (e) Method override (POST → GET, or X-HTTP-Method-Override)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "method-override=%{http_code}\n" \
"https://<TARGET>/account/[email protected]" -H "Cookie: $COOKIE"
HTTP 200/302 on (a)-(e) = protection missing or trivially bypassable.
2. Bypass / misconfig matrix
| Class | Server flaw | Bypass |
|---|---|---|
| Token absent | no token at all | direct cross-origin form POST |
| Token not validated | header sent but never checked | send empty / random token |
| Token not bound to session | token from another account works | mint a token in attacker account, use against victim |
| Predictable token | sequential / timestamp / md5(userid) | precompute |
| Token in URL | leaks via Referer / logs / shoulder | steal then replay |
| Method-override | _method=POST, X-HTTP-Method-Override: POST |
turn protected POST into a GET CSRF |
| JSON CSRF | accepts Content-Type: application/json from forms |
submit form with enctype=text/plain + crafted body, or use fetch |
| Content-type bypass | only validates token when CT=application/x-www-form-urlencoded |
switch to text/plain or multipart/form-data |
| SameSite=Lax gap | top-level GET still sends cookie | GET-based state change, or <form method=POST> triggered by user click |
| SameSite=None | no protection at all | classic cross-site form |
| Missing on subset | only /admin/* protected |
unprotected sister endpoint (/api/v1/email) |
| Login CSRF | login endpoint has no token | force victim into attacker's account → captures victim activity |
| Logout CSRF | logout has no token | denial-of-service / phishing reset |
| Double-submit cookie flaw | cookie not __Host- prefixed / set from any subdomain |
XSS on subdomain plants the cookie + matching body value |
| Referer-only check | header strippable | <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer"> on attacker page |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 124 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A ae46d742cc4f
csrf is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,452 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,660 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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