Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-iam-patternsnpx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill aws-iam-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-iam-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-iam-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-iam-patterns.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.02148 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01074 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00430 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00215 |
Grade A, and why
aws-iam-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 264 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AWS IAM Patterns
Secure IAM policy patterns, least-privilege templates, and the policy evaluation logic that governs all AWS access control.
Knowledge Base
IAM Policy Evaluation Logic
This is the most important concept in AWS security. Every API call is evaluated as follows:
- Explicit Deny -- If ANY policy says Deny, the action is denied. Period. No override.
- Organizations SCP -- If no SCP allows it, denied (SCPs are allowlists for member accounts).
- Resource-based policy -- If a resource policy grants access, it can allow cross-account access without an identity policy (except for IAM roles in the same account).
- Identity-based policy -- The policies attached to the user/role/group.
- Permissions boundary -- If set, the effective permissions are the INTERSECTION of the identity policy and the boundary.
- Session policy -- For assumed roles or federated users, further restricts to the intersection.
- Implicit Deny -- If nothing explicitly allows it, denied.
Understanding this chain is what separates a secure AWS environment from a breached one.
Policy Types and When to Use Each
| Policy Type | Attached To | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Identity-based (managed) | Users, roles, groups | Standard permissions for principals |
| Identity-based (inline) | Single user/role/group | Exception permissions that should not be reusable |
| Resource-based | S3 buckets, KMS keys, SQS queues, Lambda, etc. | Cross-account access, service principal access |
| Permissions boundary | Users, roles | Delegation -- let developers create roles within a boundary |
| SCP | Organization OU/account | Guardrails -- prevent entire categories of actions |
| Session policy | AssumeRole, GetFederationToken | Further restrict a specific session |
Patterns
Pattern 1: Least-Privilege Role for a Lambda Function
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "ReadSpecificDynamoDBTable",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"dynamodb:GetItem",
"dynamodb:Query",
"dynamodb:BatchGetItem"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:123456789012:table/orders"
},
{
"Sid": "WriteToSpecificS3Prefix",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:PutObject"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::reports-bucket/lambda-output/*"
},
{
"Sid": "AllowLogging",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"logs:CreateLogGroup",
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:/aws/lambda/my-function:*"
}
]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 264 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A d3beb7cdc687
aws-iam-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,148 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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