Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/hyperlogue/r3/security-modelnpx skills add hyperlogue/r3 --skill security-modelgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hyperlogue/r3What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00120 | $0.02288 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00060 | $0.01144 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00458 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00229 |
Grade A, and why
security-model scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
`Origin` header (as `curl` sends none), so while the daemon isn't exposed, any How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 177 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
r3's security model
This file is the design source of truth for r3's security posture — update it
here when the posture changes. AGENTS.md carries only the one-line invariants;
the reasoning lives here.
The threat model r3 actually defends: browser-borne attack (DNS rebinding,
cross-origin fetch) and casual remote access. It explicitly does not
defend against other local UIDs — see "What this does not protect" below.
The bind
Binds 127.0.0.1 by default. R3_BIND overrides it, and that is an explicit
opt-in with consequences (it arms the login gate — below). Never bind 0.0.0.0.
Layer 1 — the Host guard (DNS-rebinding defense)
Every request that returns data or the token — i.e. all of /api/*, including
/api/boot — must carry a Host that is one of:
- loopback,
- an allowlisted name (
R3_ALLOWED_HOSTS, exact names, never*), or - the advertised public host, derived from
R3_PUBLIC_URLand allowed implicitly (config.ts) — since r3 hands that URL out, it must resolve. This is why a singleR3_PUBLIC_URL=https://<name>is enough fortailscale serve, with no separateR3_ALLOWED_HOSTSfor the common one-host case.
The static SPA shell + hashed JS/CSS/favicon are served natively by
Bun.serve's routes, outside this Hono guard. That's fine: they carry no
secrets and grant no capability — the app is inert until the Host-gated
/api/boot bootstraps it. Never let a data/token endpoint out from behind the
guard.
Layer 2 — token or session cookie on every data endpoint
Every /api data endpoint requires the per-user token or a valid session
cookie (resolveAuth) — reads as well as writes.
Always token-free (still Host-gated):
| Route | Extra gate |
|---|---|
/api/health |
— |
/api/boot |
same-origin |
/api/auth/login |
same-origin (you have no session yet) |
/api/events |
only while REQUIRE_LOGIN is off |
/api/events is the subtle one: EventSource can't set headers, so SSE goes
token-free while login isn't required. Once REQUIRE_LOGIN is on, a session
cookie rides EventSource and it's gated like any read. Note the condition is
REQUIRE_LOGIN, not "exposed" — there is no EXPOSED predicate, and
R3_REQUIRE_LOGIN=0 on an exposed daemon leaves SSE open.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 177 lines · 120 tokens per session scan A e0ca00bbbec1
security-model is a skill published in the GitHub repository hyperlogue/r3 (23 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 120 tokens to every session and 2,288 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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