Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill cicd-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/cicd-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/cicd-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/cicd-supply-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/cicd-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/cicd-supply-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Tool Misuse · line 100 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.02494 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.01247 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00499 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00249 |
Grade A, and why
cicd-supply-chain scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| Dependency confusion | Install-time outbound from build host; package version anomaly (very high ver) | EDR proc-tree `npm/pip` -> `curl/node -e`; registry telemetry | Higher public version wins resolver; noisy if scop How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CI/CD Pipeline Poisoning & Supply-Chain Attacks
When to Activate
- Auditing or attacking GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins pipelines for code execution
- Hunting
pull_request_target/workflow_run"pwn requests" and Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) - Assessing compromised third-party Actions, mutable version tags, and Actions cache poisoning
- Dependency confusion, typo/slopsquatting, and malicious package/install-hook payloads
- Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse and runner backdoors
- CI secret exfiltration and OIDC cloud-role (AWS/GCP/Azure) trust-policy abuse
- Validating SLSA build provenance and signing gates (defense / blue-team validation)
Technique Map
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Pwn request (pull_request_target checkout of fork head) |
T1195.001 | CWE-269 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
Script injection (${{ github.event.* }} into run:) |
T1059 | CWE-94 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
| Direct / Indirect PPE (workflow or build-file modification) | T1195.001 | CWE-913 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
GitLab .gitlab-ci.yml poisoning / pipeline-as-user (CVE-2024-6678) |
T1648 | CWE-863 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
| Compromised Action via mutable tag (CVE-2025-30066 tj-actions) | T1195.001 | CWE-494 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Transitive Action compromise (CVE-2025-30154 reviewdog) | T1195.001 | CWE-1357 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Actions cache poisoning (cross-workflow escalation) | T1525 | CWE-349 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Dependency confusion (internal name on public registry) | T1195.002 | CWE-427 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/dependency_confusion.py |
| Typo / slopsquatting + malicious install hook | T1195.002 | CWE-829 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/dependency_confusion.py |
| Self-replicating registry worm (Shai-Hulud npm) | T1195.002 | CWE-829 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse & backdoor | T1199 | CWE-668 | references/runner-attacks.md | scripts/runner_recon.sh |
Jenkins Script Console RCE (/script, CVE-2024-23897) |
T1648 | CWE-306 | references/runner-attacks.md | scripts/runner_recon.sh |
CI secret exfiltration (toJSON(secrets), GhostAction) |
T1552.004 | CWE-522 | references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
OIDC trust-policy abuse (missing/* sub, wrong org wildcard) |
T1078.004 | CWE-1390 | references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
| Build provenance / signing gate validation (defense) | T1195 | CWE-347 | references/build-integrity-defense.md | scripts/provenance_verify.sh |
What ships with it
12 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/action-dependency-compromise.md 7.5 KB
- references/build-integrity-defense.md 8.2 KB
- references/package-registry-attacks.md 7.6 KB
- references/pipeline-poisoning.md 9.5 KB
- references/runner-attacks.md 7.3 KB
- references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md 8.1 KB
- scripts/dependency_confusion.py 4.9 KB runs code
- scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py 9.4 KB runs code
- scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py 7.9 KB runs code
- scripts/provenance_verify.sh 3.5 KB runs code
- scripts/runner_recon.sh 5.1 KB runs code
- scripts/workflow_auditor.py 7.9 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 117 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A 0b371f773891
cicd-supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (357 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 2,494 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
setup-solution
Creates a Dataverse publisher and solution, then adds Power Pages site components to the solution for ALM and deployment management. Use when asked to: "create solution", "set up solution", "add to solution", "package site into solution", "create publisher", "solutionize my site", or "set up ALM for my site".
setup-pipeline
Sets up a Power Platform Pipeline for automated Power Pages deployments. Power Platform Pipelines is Microsoft's native CI/CD tool built into the Power Platform — no external infrastructure required. Use when asked to: "set up ci/cd", "create pipeline", "setup pipeline", "set up power platform pipelines", "create…
configure-env-variables
Configures environment variables for Power Pages site settings to support ALM across environments. Creates environment variable definitions in Dataverse, guides the user through linking site settings to those variables via the Power Pages Management app, adds the variables to the solution, and generates a…
force-link-environment
Force-links a development or target environment to a Power Platform Pipelines host, overriding any existing association with a previous host. Use when creating a deploymentenvironments record fails with "this environment is already associated with another pipelines host", or when intentionally migrating an environment…
diagnose-deployment
Surfaces PAC CLI upload errors and Dataverse async operation errors, pattern-matches against a known failure catalog, and optionally auto-fixes identified issues. Use when asked to: "diagnose deployment", "debug deployment", "deployment failed", "show deployment errors", "fix deployment issues", "show upload logs"…
add-azuredevops
Adds Azure DevOps connector to a Power Apps code app. Use when querying work items, creating bugs, managing pipelines, or making ADO API calls.