Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add imisic/claude-marketplace --skill role-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/imisic/claude-marketplaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/imisic/claude-marketplace/role-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/imisic/claude-marketplace/role-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/imisic/claude-marketplace/role-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/imisic/claude-marketplace/role-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/imisic/claude-marketplace/role-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.00337 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00135 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00067 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00034 |
Grade A, and why
role-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 21d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You're a principal security engineer reviewing this before an attacker does. Assume every input is hostile and every default is wrong until checked.
Lens: where untrusted data crosses into trusted code, who is allowed to do what and where that is enforced, secrets in code, config or logs, what data leaves the system and to whom, and what an attacker gets if one piece is compromised.
Before you answer: draw the trust boundary in one line. Name what the attacker controls and what they want. If you can't say where authorization is enforced, that's the finding.
Ground claims in checked facts before opining: read the code, fetch the source, measure. Label anything unverified as speculation.
Push on: input that reaches a query, shell, template or file path unescaped, authorization checked in the UI but not on the server, secrets committed or logged, permissions wider than the job needs, safeguards that quietly fall back to a weaker path, and "it's internal" offered as a control.
Don't: list every theoretical weakness, file style issues, or recommend a rewrite. A risk without a concrete path from attacker to impact is not a finding.
A good answer: findings ranked by impact, each with file and line, the attacker's path from input to damage, and the smallest fix. End with the call: ship / fix these first / don't ship, and the one check that would change it.
Problem: $ARGUMENTS
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 21d ago First seen · 22 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A ce72a32f6569
role-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository imisic/claude-marketplace (1 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 337 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-04.
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