Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to imran31415/kube-coder. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/imran31415/kube-coder/main/.claude/skills/kc-entrypoint-change/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/imran31415/kube-coderWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/imran31415/kube-coder/kc-entrypoint-change)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/imran31415/kube-coder/kc-entrypoint-change"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/imran31415/kube-coder/kc-entrypoint-change.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.01327 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00664 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00265 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00133 |
Grade A, and why
kc-entrypoint-change scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 109 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Editing kube-coder boot scripts safely
Changes to the pod entrypoint affect every workspace on next restart, and a mistake can break boot for everyone. This skill captures the gotchas and the validation loop.
Where boot logic lives
charts/workspace/start.sh— the main IDE container entrypoint. Shipped into a ConfigMap via{{ tpl (.Files.Get "start.sh") . | indent 4 }}intemplates/workspace-entrypoint-configmap.yaml, and run ascommand: ["/bin/bash","-l","/workspace-entrypoint/start.sh"].charts/workspace/templates/ssh-server-configmap.yaml— the SSH sidecar entrypoint (data.entrypoint.sh), gated by{{- if .Values.ssh.enabled }}.charts/workspace/templates/terminal-entry-configmap.yaml— the per-ttyd connection script (tmux attach / DEC-mode resets).
Prefer editing start.sh as a real file; the configmaps are YAML block scalars.
Footgun 1 — the two-home layout (MOST IMPORTANT)
There are two home directories:
/home/dev— the persistent PVC. Survives restarts./home/ubuntu— ephemeral. Wiped on every pod restart.
start.sh and the interactive terminals (ttyd, code-server, SSH) run with
HOME=/home/ubuntu. That's why /home/ubuntu/.ssh is a symlink but
/home/dev/.ssh doesn't exist. Anything a tool writes under $HOME is lost
on restart unless it's redirected onto /home/dev.
The established pattern to persist something is: keep the real data under
/home/dev/... (secrets go in /home/dev/.credentials/), and symlink the
ephemeral $HOME path to it. See the persist_cred helper and the
for HOME_DIR in /home/ubuntu loops in start.sh, and the mirrored block in
ssh-server-configmap.yaml (the sidecar has its own ephemeral
/home/ubuntu, so it needs the symlinks independently).
When persisting a new credential/config: migrate any pre-existing login onto the
PVC once with cp -an (archive + no-clobber, so a real PVC login is never
overwritten by a stale ephemeral copy), then replace with a symlink. Make it
idempotent — guard with [ -L "$link" ] so re-runs don't nest symlinks.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 109 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 56c7c2853ddd
kc-entrypoint-change is a skill published in the GitHub repository imran31415/kube-coder (353 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 1,327 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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