Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add isaacsight/kernel --skill secrets-leak-scangit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/isaacsight/kernelWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/isaacsight/kernel/secrets-leak-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/isaacsight/kernel/secrets-leak-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/isaacsight/kernel/secrets-leak-scan.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 3 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 76 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.01027 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00513 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00205 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00103 |
Grade A, and why
secrets-leak-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 110 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Secrets Leak Scan
A leaked key in git history is a leaked key forever. This skill catches them before they ship and rotates them when they already did.
When to Use
- Before pushing a new branch to a public remote
- After any
git rebasethat touched config files - After a teammate says "I think I committed something I shouldn't have"
- Quarterly, against the entire history, even if no one reported anything
- Before open-sourcing a previously private repo
Iron Laws
A SECRET IN HISTORY IS A SECRET LEAKED.
ROTATE FIRST, EXPLAIN SECOND.
NEVER REWRITE PUBLIC HISTORY WITHOUT TEAM CONSENT.
Four Phases
Phase 1 — Working tree
Sweep what is on disk right now. The cheapest catch.
Patterns to grep, ranked by signal:
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}— AWS access keysk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}— OpenAI / Anthropic / genericxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+— Slack tokensghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}/github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}— GitHub PAT-----BEGIN (RSA |OPENSSH |EC )?PRIVATE KEY-----— any private keyeyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}— JWT[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}— long base64 (high false-positive, last resort)
Files that warrant a manual look regardless of grep hits: .env*, config/*.yml, *.pem, *.key, *credentials*, *secrets*.
Phase 2 — Git history
git rev-list --all | xargs -I{} git grep -E '<pattern>' {} -- '*.json' '*.yml' '*.env*' 2>/dev/null
For each hit:
- Identify the commit hash and author
- Determine the secret class (rotate-able? revoke-able?)
- Check whether the commit was ever pushed to a remote you don't fully control
Phase 3 — Rotate
Order of operations matters. Rotate before rewriting history — the old secret is already out there.
- Rotate the credential at the source (cloud console, OAuth app, GitHub).
- Audit the credential's recent usage — was anything done with it since the leak commit?
- Update the live deployment with the new credential.
- Confirm the old credential no longer works.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 110 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 9a2a382e67b6
secrets-leak-scan is a skill published in the GitHub repository isaacsight/kernel (16 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 1,027 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
pr
Create a pull request using the Dedalus PR template. Injects git state, commit history, and diff stats automatically.
commit-and-push
Stage, commit, and push changes without opening a PR. Use when the user says "commit and push", "commit these to a new branch", "push this branch", or wants a branch + commit summary but does not want PR creation. Distinct from yeet, which owns the commit + push + PR flow.
git-workflow
Trunk-based git workflow with worktrees, switch/restore over checkout, Conventional Commits, force-with-lease. Use whenever the user asks me to commit, push, branch, or rebase.
app-store-changelog-v2
App Store Changelog workflow skill. Use this skill when the user needs Generate user-facing App Store release notes from git history since the last tag and the operator should preserve the upstream workflow, copied support files, and provenance before merging or handing off.
yeet
Use only when the user explicitly asks to stage, commit, push, and open a GitHub pull request in one flow using the GitHub CLI (gh).
commit
Create a git commit with conventional commit format. Injects current git state automatically.