Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add j4flmao/agent-skills --skill owasp-web-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/j4flmao/agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/owasp-web-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/owasp-web-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/owasp-web-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/owasp-web-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/owasp-web-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.00705 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00352 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00141 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00071 |
Grade B, and why
owasp-web-security scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- **Application Layer**: Implement an allowlist of permitted domains/IPs. Never trust user-provided URLs to access internal metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDS, `169.254.169.254`). Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Identification via SAST**: Trace tainted input to HTTP client sinks (e.g., `requests.get()`, `cURL`). How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 49 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OWASP Web Security & Vulnerability Mechanics
As an application security analyst, you must understand the theoretical underpinnings of web vulnerabilities to accurately identify them through static code analysis (SAST) and remediate them architecturally.
1. Theoretical Mechanics of Injection Flaws
Injection vulnerabilities (SQLi, NoSQLi, OS Command Injection) occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The core theoretical failure is the lack of separation between control plane (syntax) and data plane.
- Identification via SAST: Look for sinks (e.g.,
execute(),exec(),eval()) where the data flow graph shows input from an untrusted source without intervening sanitization or parameterization nodes. - Architectural Remediation: The definitive defense is the adoption of parameterized interfaces (e.g., Prepared Statements) or Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) frameworks that strictly enforce this separation by treating all input purely as literal values.
2. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
SSRF arises when a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It exploits the trust relationship the server has with its internal network.
- Identification via SAST: Trace tainted input to HTTP client sinks (e.g.,
requests.get(),cURL). - Architectural Remediation:
- Network Layer: Segment the application's network access using strict egress firewalls.
- Application Layer: Implement an allowlist of permitted domains/IPs. Never trust user-provided URLs to access internal metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDS,
169.254.169.254).
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
XSS is the result of reflecting untrusted data in a web browser without proper contextual output encoding, allowing the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the victim's session context.
- Mechanics: DOM-based XSS involves data flowing from a
source(e.g.,location.hash) to asink(e.g.,innerHTML) purely client-side. Reflected/Stored XSS involves the server echoing data into the HTML response. - Architectural Remediation:
- Context-Aware Encoding: Apply HTML entity encoding, JavaScript encoding, or URL encoding depending on where the data is placed.
- Content Security Policy (CSP): Deploy strict CSP headers (
default-src 'self') to mitigate the impact by restricting where scripts can be loaded from and preventing inline script execution.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 49 lines · 21 tokens per session scan B f1b77369a932
owasp-web-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository j4flmao/agent-skills (23 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 705 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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