Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add JakubMikolajek/codex-skills-collection --skill security-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JakubMikolajek/codex-skills-collectionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jakubmikolajek/codex-skills-collection/security-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jakubmikolajek/codex-skills-collection/security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jakubmikolajek/codex-skills-collection/security-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jakubmikolajek/codex-skills-collection/security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jakubmikolajek/codex-skills-collection/security-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 179 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.02340 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01170 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00468 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00234 |
Grade A, and why
security-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 229 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Hardening
This skill enforces structured security analysis before code reaches production. It covers the most common vulnerabilities found in backend systems and provides concrete mitigation patterns per category.
When to Use
- Any backend feature that handles user input, file uploads, or external data
- Any task involving authentication, authorization, sessions, or tokens
- Code review with a security focus (
/review+ security scope) - Before deploying a new API endpoint, service, or integration to production
- When the codebase is new and no security baseline has been established
When NOT to Use
- Pure frontend UI tasks with no backend interaction
- Infrastructure configuration reviewed separately under a dedicated infra checklist
- Internal tooling with no external network exposure and no user data
Core Principle
Assume breach at every boundary. Every input is hostile, every token is potentially stolen, every dependency is potentially compromised. Security is not a final step — it is a constraint on every design decision.
Security Hardening Process
Use the checklist below and track progress:
Security hardening progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Inventory trust boundaries and data flows
- [ ] Step 2: Audit authentication and authorization
- [ ] Step 3: Validate input handling and injection surface
- [ ] Step 4: Review secrets and credential management
- [ ] Step 5: Check security headers and transport
- [ ] Step 6: Verify dependency and supply chain hygiene
- [ ] Step 7: Produce Security Review output
Step 1: Inventory trust boundaries and data flows
Map every point where untrusted data enters the system:
- HTTP request bodies, query params, headers, cookies
- File upload content and filenames
- Webhook payloads from third parties
- Data read from external APIs or message queues
- Data read from the database that originated from user input
For each entry point, verify: who validates it, where, and how failures are handled.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 229 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A fc503797457f
security-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository JakubMikolajek/codex-skills-collection (5 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 2,340 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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