Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jamditis/claude-skills-journalism --skill api-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jamditis/claude-skills-journalismWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/api-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/api-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/api-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/api-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/api-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 469 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 607 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 610 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.12010 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.06005 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.02402 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.01201 |
Grade B, and why
api-hardening scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Encoded or obfuscated payloadmediumSupply chain
base64 or hex that is decoded and executed hides what actually runs from anyone reading the file.
obj = marshal.loads(request.body) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
// Allow requests with no origin (mobile apps, curl, etc.) Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
const { exec, execFile, spawn } = require('child_process'); How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,165 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
API hardening
Defense-in-depth patterns for protecting APIs from abuse, injection attacks, and data leakage. Recipes are oriented around the OWASP API Security Top 10:2023 and were last verified on 2026-05-08.
Step 0: Research the current security landscape (do this first)
Security knowledge ages on a 6-12 month half-life. The recipes below were last verified on 2026-05-08; they may be stale by the time you read this. Before applying any pattern in this skill, fan out research scoped to the API surface or web defense being added so the recipes are interpreted against current authoritative sources, not against this file's snapshot.
Default-on, with a documented skip
Run the 4-angle research below by default. Skip ONLY when ALL of these hold:
- (a) You ran this same skill on this same primitive within the last 4 hours of the current session,
- (b) That prior research surfaced no urgent advisories for the API surface or web defense being added,
- (c) You log a one-line
Research skipped because <reason>note in your response.
"I think I know" / "moving fast" / "user wants this done quickly" / "already familiar" are NOT valid skip reasons. The whole point of this preamble is that future-you should not trust this skill body's defaults until current state is checked.
Fan out 4 subagents in parallel
Each subagent returns ≤300 words of bullets with citations. Dispatch all 4 in a single message so they run concurrently.
Angle 1, Authoritative standards. Have NIST / OWASP / IETF (RFCs and Internet-Drafts) / W3C / CISA published anything new about the API surface or web defense being added in the last 6-12 months? Look for: spec finalizations, deprecations, replacement specs, RFC publications, draft revisions, NIST SP updates, OWASP project version bumps. Cite by document number + publication date.
Angle 2, Active exploitation. What's actively being exploited that targets the API surface or web defense being added? Pull from: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog (filter to last 6-12 months), recent CVE / GHSA entries with high CVSS or in-the-wild exploitation, breach postmortems and incident reports (CSRB, vendor RCAs, security-vendor research). Surface CWE patterns dominating recent KEV adds. Cite by CVE number + advisory URL.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 1,165 lines · 39 tokens per session scan B 7287ea0f9344
api-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository jamditis/claude-skills-journalism (391 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 12,010 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (encoded or obfuscated payload, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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